The Navy’s missile problem is no longer just about ships. It is about empty launch space, thin inventories, and a replacement pipeline that is moving too slowly. By the end of the decade, the service is set to lose one of its most concentrated sources of naval firepower as four Ohio-class guided-missile submarines leave service and the last Ticonderoga-class cruisers head for retirement. The arithmetic is stark: The retirement of the four Ohio‑class SSGNs and the Ticonderoga‑class cruisers is projected to remove roughly 2,080 VLS cells from the fleet’s inventory 616 from the submarines and about 1,464 from the cruisers shrinking the Navy’s concentrated missile capacity at a potentially critical moment Those cells are not all filled with Tomahawks at all times, but they define how much offensive and defensive firepower the fleet can surge when demand rises suddenly.
The four SSGNs mattered because they acted as underwater magazines. Each could carry 154 Tomahawks, while also supporting special operations forces, unmanned systems, and clandestine insertion missions. That combination made them more than strike platforms. They were flexible, forward-deployable assets built around volume, and volume is exactly what the Navy risks losing. That shortfall has become harder to dismiss after recent deployments saw unusually high missile expenditures, including hundreds of Tomahawks and defensive missiles used during extended operations.
Between late 2023 and early 2025, sustained maritime operations drove missile use to levels that challenged long-standing assumptions about replenishment. One carrier strike group alone fired 135 Tomahawks and 155 defensive missiles during a single deployment, according to deployment expenditure figures. The broader lesson was not tied to one theater. It showed that a prolonged campaign can drain magazines faster than industry can refill them, even before a higher-end conflict is considered. Pentagon budget documents cited in public reporting show Tomahawk procurement moving at relatively modest rates in recent fiscal years, and Procurement figures show relatively modest new Tomahawk buys in recent years, and production rates lag behind potential wartime demand due to specialized parts and a constrained industrial base. In practical terms, the fleet is balancing two separate stresses at once: fewer launch cells in service and fewer missiles available to reload them.
The Virginia Payload Module is meant to help absorb part of the shortfall Block V Virginia‑class submarines can carry up to around 40 Tomahawks but this incrementally replaces far more concentrated firepower and won’t fully offset the loss of the Ohio‑class SSGNs’ capacity. But the timing remains the central issue. A capability that arrives gradually does not fully replace a capability that disappears in dense, ready-to-fire blocks.
Industrial capacity sits at the center of that gap. Public reporting has described plans to expand missile production, and major suppliers have announced investments in additional output. Congress has also directed billions toward the munitions industrial base and rocket motor infrastructure. Those efforts matter, but they are still part of a medium-term repair, not an immediate answer.
The Navy’s challenge is therefore broader than the Tomahawk itself. It is a magazine-depth problem shaped by ship retirements, uneven procurement, shipyard strain, and a defense industry still rebuilding surge capacity. Analysis of Navy inventories highlights that while the fleet possesses thousands of VLS cells across ship classes, recent procurement and delivery rates suggest it may be difficult to fill all of them rapidly in a high‑use scenario Against that backdrop, the loss of 2,080 cells is not a bookkeeping issue. It changes how much pressure the Navy can absorb before firepower starts to narrow. That is why the retirement of the SSGNs and cruisers stands out. The Navy is not just losing old hulls. It is losing concentrated capacity before the replacement architecture is fully ready.
