Yes, a German Eurofighter did once intentionally, deliberately, “down” a F-22. The timeless fairy tale of Red Flag-Alaska 2012 is a type that will not go away: The fourth generation European fighter scoring notional victories in the air-dominance version of the premier American jet. There were later pictures of Typhoons sporting mock victories insignia and the gallows humor joke of “Raptor salad for lunch” became the catchphrase. The engineering-and-tactics fact is that the part of the episode most likely to make headlines lies atop an exercise structure that is designed to push pilots and not to declare a winner.
The main focus of the argument was a series of one-on-one Basic Fighter Maneuvers (BFM) at visual range between German Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons of Tactical Air Force Wing 74 and American Air Force F-22s. The initial state is important, as it deprives the Raptor of its favorite way of control detect, decide, shoot, and abandon. F-22 is built with a “first-shot opportunity,” which is made possible through stealth and built-in avionics, and it is specified in both the mission and features overview of the service. Plunge into a forced melt down and the battle is another test altogether.
Reports associated the result to asymmetric configuration principles: the F-22s were reported to be flying with external tanks, whereas Typhoons were clean no tanks, no external stores with the highest agility and high angle-of-attack maneuverability. Under that arrangement, the quote by German pilot Maj. Marc Grune, summed up what startled his side concerning the close-in geometry: “We were even evenly matched. They did not anticipate that we would become so aggressively” so, they did not expect it. That is, the engagement demonstrated the rapidity with which a modern engagement can shift when a beyond-visual-range optimized jet has to engage in a classical energy-position battle.
The reason why this juxtaposition resonates so effectively amongst the aviation audience is that the mythology of F-22 is rooted in missions where it seemed that this aircraft had an unequal edge. Precisely that dynamic was described in the early Red Flag years of the jet when Air Combat Command wrote a 2007 feature on the Raptor at Red Flag, discussing the frequently-heard complaint of an exchange pilot: “I can not see the [expletive deleted] thing.” That article also highlighted the importance of thrust vectoring, internal carriage, and power in enabling the F-22 to maintain high-G manoevering-capabilities, which are also applicable after a combat situation has degenerated into visual range, despite the shaping advantage of stealth becoming less critical in a knife fight.
Another tactical trade which engineers and pilots are both aware of was observed in the Red Flag -Alaska BFM vignette: a sudden transition to a nose authority of extreme magnitude can be achieved through thrust vectoring, but the excessively aggressive post-stall maneuvers can result in energy wasting. There was commentary of some Typhoon that described the exotic-looking moves of the Raptor as chance, provided the initial snapshot failed to make contact, as the slower jet might be exposed when the first moves to the right. It does not imply that thrust vectoring is a bad thing, it highlights the importance of the way a capability is applied being just as important as its possession.
One of the correctives that have been lost in the “Raptor downed” retelling is that the outcomes of large-force training, and the rate of mission success, cannot be estimated by one tally in BFM. Red Flag is meant to create uneasy circumstances, prompt crews to err, and develop muscle memory on making decisions under duress. A visual-range start one-on-one is a stress test- and this is why it is very handy since this is not how the F-22 is designed to begin combat. The event continues to happen due to its counterintuitive nature rather than its re-writing of the airpower fundamentals.
Ultimately, the more compelling lesson in engineering is that the benefit of aircraft is conditional: sensors, signatures, fuel state, external drag, rules of engagement, and technique of the pilot can squeeze or stretch a gap between performance dramatically. The simulated wins of the Typhoon were real as the results of training because they are real and they are also real as the reminder that even the most optimized design can be turned into a banality when the circumstances are conducive to being unfair in the other way.
