How does it change when a stealth fighter ceases being a shooter and begins to behave like a flying commanding post? In the case of carrier strike groups that will be engaged within contested waters, a less appealing set of solutions exists: further detection range, quicker targeting, and additional methods of an enemy to accomplish a maritime death chain.
The twin-seat J-20S “Mighty Dragon” of China is attracting little attention to the second cockpit as such as to what the second crewmember can accomplish with it. The two operator set-up is highly appropriate when the aircraft is handling both sensors, electronic warfare, datalinks and other platforms even when unmanned, and still maintaining the jet airworthy. The J-20S, in that framing, appears to be an effort to transform a low-observable fighter into an aerial node, capable of managing manned-unmanned teaming and distributing targeting data in real time, as opposed to having a single pilot manage all of it simultaneously.
A larger operation is also planned to be done by the variant, which is publicly outlined by Chinese state media. According to China Central Television, the J-20S has a precision strike ability against both ground and maritime targets, an electronic jamming and tactical command and control ability and that they are able to engage manned-unmanned teaming operations. This is important since maritime strike is not so much about how heavy a platform is loaded with weapons but to keep in touch with a moving ship, update targeting, and push information across domains before the target moves or defense measures take place.
The key facilitator to such work is the J-20 family sensor package in particular its active electronically scanned array radar. The issue of the J-20 with a large nose radome and the usefulness of loading more transmit/receive modules into an AESA has long been the subject of open-source analysis, as module density is related to power and performance in the airplane. A Chinese-language statement that was widely distributed was a concise summary of the relationship: it can be observed that the size of the transmission power and the size of the distance of detection directly depend on the number of T/R modules [the TR module is] like a relay station and signal amplifier]. Together with a second operator who may focus on classification, correlation and track management, the J-20S concept is compatible with a standoff “find-fix-track” concept that has the potential to support long range shots without forcing the aircraft into the middle of vessel based air defenses.
This logic of standoff gets even more acute when this is combined with high-speed anti-ship weapons. China has demonstrated a hypersonic anti-ship missile launched by the ships known as the YJ-20, which is an aero-ballistic missile which is aimed at making it difficult to intercept the missile due to its speed and maneuverability. The missile is said to have a range not less than 620 miles with velocities exceeding Mach 5, with some greater terminal velocities estimated, as per a video of a Type 055 destroyer launching a YJ-20. Hypersonic weapons also condense times; even in well-functioning defense systems, reduced reaction time strains all the connections of the detection, positioning, engagement coordination, and re-engagement.
All this does not mandate that J-20S should be a solo “death of the carrier.” The more realistic engineer tale is integration: a stealth aircraft with enhanced maritime strike capabilities as a forward sensor and a coordinator of unmanned teammates and that with which other launch platforms, in the air, on the surface, or on the shore, bridges the gap more quickly. A two seat stealth fighter, in that aircraft, is not a new development like a message and indicator that China is developing battle management in the air at the tactical level where the hardest part is maintaining a tight and up to date target solution on an aircraft that is doing all it can to remain undetected.
