such range calls as “Fox 2” is one of those that immediately deflate reputations. It signifies an in visual range infrared projectile strike, and in that arena even the most advanced stealth fighter in the world is likely to be made to obey geometry, timing and execution of the pilot.
It is within that context that the so-called training incident where a Philippine Air Force FA-50 had recorded a simulated “death” on a U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor during Exercise Cope Thunder has been noted. The Philippine Air force journal itself said the outcome was a historic milestone and it is easy to understand why, a light fighter/trainer derivative running a clean WVR shot on the jet that many would consider the standard of air superiority.
Cope Thunder in itself is meant to sharpen tactics and interoperability as opposed to generating a scoreboard. The version applicable to the narrative followed the reintroduction of the exercise to the Philippines in 2023, a recreation of the name, which was first used in the area in the 1970s prior to the resemblance to the large-force training ecosystem in Alaska. Aircrew in such incidents are often deliberately placed in awkward configurations, such as limited weapons use, limited sensors, role-playing, and regulations which force merges to train crews to recognize, deconflict, and recover when the battle begins to resemble the brochure. It is only after one treats the engagement which resulted in the “Fox 2” call as a free-play duel and not as a controlled training vignette, that it becomes a surprise.
In the distance, the philosophy of the design of the F-22 is to steer clear of this type of knife fight. With low observable shaping and coats, sensor package, and premium kinematics, it will be designed to provide “first look, first shot” opportunities well before a visual merge. The advantage can be reversed by training to restrict employment beyond visual range, impair radar usage, or writing into the initial conditions that the Raptor will be on the defensive. Within the visual arena, which is now the matter at hand, stealth is a secondary factor, and survivability is much more heavily dependent on seeing whom first and managing energy resource more effectively, as well as being able to drive a missile-like track before the window closes.
The FA-50, in its turn, is neither an exotic air combat platform nor an exotic aircraft, being instead a modern and supersonic aircraft based on the T-50 trainer heritage with functional avionics and weapon systems on board. It has a history of development and use as a replacement of old fleets as well as an alternative option of flexibility in light combat and has been adopted by other countries besides South Korea like the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia with other international acquisitions recorded in the service and delivery history section of the FA-50 program. The smaller size of the aircraft, the quick reaction and the fact that the pilot can use a small error to his advantage in the WVR training could be more important than the brochure comparisons of stealth or radar power.
“Raptor death” do have a long history of precedence as well, appearing dramatic on their own. One case has involved a French Rafale pilot who was reported on a 2009 training exercise to have the F-22 in the sights of the Rafale pilot and that the pilot was even reported to be pulling 9 Gs as mentioned in the report on that UAE training. Other fourth generation fighters have also recorded WVR wins in limited training conditions as well, the same theme, close range works in your favor and whoever reads the merge better.
Others are the most educative bits that enthusiasts would not read. The vulnerability of the F-22 to WVR has long been discussed in terms of things such as helmet cueing and opponents with IRST capabilities-functions which are capable of enhancing off-boresight attack and passive detection during the visual-to-near-visual transition. The latter features do not nullify a Raptor, but they contribute to understanding why forced merges are valued by the training designers: they reveal how quickly the engagement can be turned on its head when sensors, sightlines, and missile envelopes are turned into the variables of interest.
The least important lesson is that one simulated WVR “death” will not overturn the realities of air combat. It does however, emphasise one thing that sizeable exercises are designed to demonstrate: that no platform is impregnable when the situation is designed to place an emphasis on the fringes, and that the fringes are precisely where the lessons are meant to sink in aircrew and planners.
