What has to replace a fighter which is yet being delivered to squadrons? The response of Sweden is now shaping itself not so much as a single “next jet”, but as a response architecture of air combat that will develop on its own. In a future force under the Koncept for Framtida Stridsflyg (KFS), Saab and the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) of Sweden are defining a future force whereby a crewed aircraft, coupled with families of uncrewed platforms to sense, to electronically attack, to decoy, to carry weapons, is linked by common software and increasingly autonomous decision support.

The timing is deliberate. Sweden only just started to receive the latest variant of gripen and it is only after a lengthy wait that it received the first Gripen E variant with the Swedish Air Force receiving the first Gripen E in 2013 after ordering it in 2013. It is a significant advancement in computing, sensors, and electronic combat by the C/D fleet, and the Swedish authorities have made a point of pointing out fast software update practices as a key aspect of the Gripen E. That contemporary ground level is useful in understanding why KFS is positioned as a force redesign and not a clean cut: the existing aircraft continues to present a relevant platform to experiment and develop tactics, and, most importantly, serve as a proof-of-concept of manned-unmanned teaming.
KFS came into the open in 2024 and by 2025 FMV funding shifted out of the early research into a programmed series of studies and technology development. The work involves demonstrator planning on both crewed and uncrewed tracks with Sweden maintaining freedom of action until 2030 and then a national decision on the way forward. That pacing is indicative not of lack of urgency but of the fact that the evidence preferred is technical: flights, performance measured, integration learning which can be banked irrespective of what airframe eventually grounds the idea.
Another consequence ingredient is autonomy, which should be applied as a workload reducer and a decision aid, but not as a slogan. In flight tests that have already been undertaken by Saab and Helsing a Gripen E delivered some of the functions of beyond-visual-range decision-making to an onboard AI agent, putting operational-style software into a flying testbed instead of continuing with it in simulation. That, in KFS terms, is not necessarily about replacing pilots, but rather creating a scalable “brain” that will be able to coordinate various platforms, combine sensor inputs, suggest actions, and handle a bigger tactical picture than can be safely handled in one cockpit.
The ambition of demonstrators in Sweden is in the short run. Around 2027, Saab has indicated a first demonstrator flight, and has been reported to have an unmanned fighter demonstrator. Interestingly, some of the initial focus is on determining what technologies are graduating into a future program and not attempting to demonstrate all of the sixth-generation capabilities simultaneously. The previous experience of Saab in low-observable flight is mostly in small research drones, and KFS recognizes that demonstrators are able to de-risk command-and-control, teaming and autonomy mechanisms even as signature work continues on a different track.
Similar with the concept of the future, Sweden is also investing in order to make the current system flexible. FMV has ordered, and is funding Gripen development work up to 2028, also supporting test aircraft and simulation infrastructure, at a 2.5-billion Swedish krona. This is important since KFS is not being developed in a vacuum; it is being co-developed with the aircraft, with the tools and feedback loops of operation that will enable Sweden to test new sensors, avionics, methods of integrating weapons and software behaviors rapidly.
The continuity with optionality through-line is strategic. KFS will be able to allow Sweden to develop a plausible air combat force, which can readily accommodate new uncrewed “teammates” with time without overhauling the entire force and still maintain sovereign control over mission systems and integration decisions. At that, even the most radical element of the Gripen successor narrative is not a single stealth aircraft, but the decision of the team of engineers to base it on the networked, software-defined team as the focal point.

