Why then do two supersonic fighters land pulled off and then sent back into the air when nothing appears in the radar of a controller? The query is in the background of an episode in Northern California which involved sighting of civilian pilots, military alert aircrafts, and the machine behind the procedure of handling of “unknowns” within controlled airspace. Aviation enthusiasts monitored flight-tracking data and military radio transmissions that indicated two Air Force F-16s, SURF31 and SURF32, took off of March Air Reserve Base to investigate a high-altitude object that was reported to be heading northeast. The mission was escorted by a KC-135 Stratotanker, callsign GASMN03, which was diverted to lengthen time on station by making aerial refueling, which is a standard enabling maneuver when the search area is ambiguous or the reports are continuously changing.
A civilian cargo crew prior to arrival of the fighters informed air traffic control that it was witnessing something that was “glowing and fading,” a term that is more likely to raise additional caution since it may be lighting, reflections, or a small object in a range that is tough to estimate. One exchange recorded in air traffic control audio subsequently transcribed by monitors revealed how scanty the hard data can be at the time a query is issued: one exchange between an Oakland Center controller and an aircraft nearby was recorded as the controller saying that she was not showing anything on her radar, and asking the plane to monitor a particular direction and distance.
The first intercept was about 6.30 a.m. pacific, and the time the fighters stayed in the vicinity was about 21/2 hours, after which they turned to the south. Then the speed of operations shifted once again. The tanker and F-16s were flying the final approach back to March when they were retasked due to further reports of a second object in the Northern California airspace, and they were all sent northward. The second push was slightly briefer, approximately 35 minutes in the area, indicating a faster visual recognition, or a more quickly degrading track.
Such scrambles are not as drama-oriented in the U.S. system as they are in the process of establishing “positive ID” in the event of failure in routine identification. FAA guidance explains the manner in which the control of air traffic by the national security is regulated under the 14 CFR Part 99, an aspect that clearly says that pilots who fail to follow the relevant procedures may be intercepted. The same FAA document advises aircraft to pay attention to guard frequencies 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz since an intercept may depend on the rapid establishment of two-way communications where other connections are inaccessible.
The implication of what “intercept” means in practice is also standardized. FAA paperwork also details how fighters normally come approaching behind and in many cases in groups, coming in only when necessary to collect marks and configuration data. In case the reply is needed, the interceptors may employ internationally accepted visual indicators, like rocking wings, lights during nighttime, and traveling over the route of the intercepted aircraft with a minimum distance between them. These facts are important as a pilot can be truthful in his or her visual report, particularly in the morning, and yet misleading in distance, height and speed.
Subsequently NORAD declared the objects to be of a standard weather balloon, and an airdition of an F-16 pilot description broadcast in the same report indicated a balloon-shap-like object with a hanging down line. It is also typical of an ongoing engineering and operations problem: low-speed, high-altitude, small-sized objects may pose problems in rapid classification with sensors sensitive to faster aircraft, and may be difficult to interpret when the sun is low, the reflections and thin clouds twist the view that the crews are using.
To the contemporary air defense and air traffic control, the episode depicts a long-runner reality. In cases where the mission is identification, the danger uncertainty, then the fighters, tankers, controllers, and civilian crews can join the same ad hoc sensing network, made in minutes, and dissolved when the sky can tell us what was up there.
