So what would it just require to transform a “regional bomber force,” to a legitimate global strike arm? That is the question that is clouding the much-awaited H-20 stealth bomber of China a project that has been years of both concept-art and strategic paranoia. More practically considered, the H-20 is not so much an airplane as a stress test of the capability of Chinese industry to modernize the most difficult part of modern airpower: a survivable, long-range penetrating bomber manufactured, supported, and integrated into actual service.
The Global Strike Command chief of the U.S. Air Force Gen. Stephen Davis has referred to China as a “regional bomber force at best,” and he does not mean intent. It is about execution. A stealth bomber is where all the aerodynamics, materials science, manufacturing tolerance, propulsion, electronic warfare, and mission systems must all cooperate in concert simultaneously, each time, over a scale of airframe capable of transporting significant weapons over intercontinental ranges. Up until now the United States alone has deployed a working stealth bomber and the B-2 experience and the on-going B-21 program are examples of how intolerant the details are.
Paperwise, the H- 20 can be widely perceived as an antibonic flying wing with reported range figures in the 8,500-10,000 kilometer category and a domestic cargo frequently quoted in the 10 tons range. This attraction is clear: an object that is capable of endangering remotely located airfields, ports, and command centers and also enhancing the airborne aspect of the nuclear deterrent in China. It also provides the special political-military service which bombers give and that is that an aircraft can be launched, rerouted, and recalled in a manner that ballistic missiles cannot.
The airframe itself provides the engineering challenges. China has much more experience with conventional bombers and fighters than it does big and manned flying wings. Although any shaping cues of blended contours and serrated inlets may be found in designs, the significant challenge is repeatable all-aspect signature control: seams, coatings, inlet treatment, heat control, and emissions discipline that will endure real world maintenance cycles. It does not work because a stealth bomber appears stealthy, but it works because even after thousands of hours of service it is hard to locate and track.
The other choke point is propulsion. The future of the H-20 has been based on engines that can offer range and payload without compromising observability, a challenging tradeoff in thrust, fuel economy, reliability and integration. Engine performance has been brought up as a major challenge by reference reporting, several times, and it is not a new one: a bomber cannot cover up its insufficient endurance and it cannot top-up its tanker fleet with a small tanker fleet.
That is significant as the existing bomber fleet of China is still on the basis of the Soviet-evolved H-6 family-planes which are capable to transfer the current stand-off armaments but not stealthy and vulnerable to high-tech defense. The fact that even a competent H-20 cannot negate that reality. The development of a “strategic bomber force” is also associated with the creation of training pipelines, base, secure communication, validation of weapons, and quality control of high level in quality control in production lots. It implies demonstrating the ability of the aircraft to produce sorties, not to roll out.
The analogy with the B-21 Raider cannot be omitted and it is educative as well. The B-21 is built on a current systems foundation and networked operations whereas the H-20 has a cloudy maturity in its mission-system. It is not merely being stealth shaped but the capability to integrate sensors, control signatures, and be a component of a bigger kill chain when it is needed. To China, the H-20, in any case, is a multi-decade industrial program, not a single aircraft program.
At that, the most telling fact about the H-20 is that one can say very little about its preparedness with any degree of confidence. The desire is evident; the bottlenecks are not misconstrued. The decision will be made in factories, test ranges and sustainment facilities, where stealth bombers will either be introduced as run-of-the-mill instruments of power projection, or will remain the aspirational designs that never make the necessary engineering cut.
