This planning in the absence of a determination on the future of the F-35 will play a key role in getting Canada a replacement to the CF-18 as former deputy minister of national defence Jody Thomas explained to CBC News. It is, to be brief, prudent and responsible.
Such an appraisal is the message that is contained in the fighter replacement file of Canada: money is moving faster than the politics. Although Ottawa continues to maintain the pretentious terminology of “review” in the public, it has been channeling small amounts of money towards things that make no sense in the circumstances of protecting a fleet path, but not reopening it.
The interesting feature is the upward aspect of the commitments. Canada has already placed orders to acquire 16 initial F-35s, and it has also started acquiring F-35s long lead items to acquire 14 more to guarantee that it does not lose its place in the production queue. It is this that has been the effect of modern combat-air procurement; indexing by schedules in a supplier has forfeited delay, and long-lead funding has transformed “options” by degrees into obligations. The decision timeline in terms of delivery, training pipeline, and base construction calendar is usually already defined by previous invoices by the time a cabinet-level decision is officially announced.
In the case of Canada, stealth is not a virtue on its own that constitutes the basis of its operational argument. The main mission established which is continental warning and response under NORAD relies on aircrafts which can endure, detect, and distribute information within a closely integrated U.S.Canadian system. The capability to help create a real time image and operate upon it in a timely manner is the variable that distinguishes itself in that setting, as opposed to merely showing up on scene with a radar and a missile. The controversy of a “mixed fleet”, combining a small force of F-35s with another jet to perform routine functions, is likely to underestimate the day-to-day load of operating two training streams, two maintenance ecosystems, two spares inventories, and two base-level technical support- particularly when it comes to an air force that must at the same time generate crews to deploy to missions, as well as maintain an alert positioning in the Arctic. Decisions on infrastructure are already converging on a fifth generation fleet.
The updates to the Future Fighter Capability Project in Canada indicate hardening measures which are hard to reverse: a Cold Lake Tactical Special Access Program Facility contract to support the F-35 operations, with delivery scheduled between 2026 and 2027, and a strategic partner to consider an F-35 air vehicle depot, to be used in maintenance repair, overhaul and upgrades. The integration of Canada into the mission-data business was also signaled by the hoisting of the flag of the country in the reprogramming lab of the Eglin Air Force Base which is an expedient action to a platform where the success of the platform greatly relies on the management of mission data.
All that does not negate genuine questioning especially in the area of sustainment. The U.S. Government Accountability office has reported that the estimated F-35 maintenance costs have increased by 1.1 trillion in 2018 to 1.58 trillion in 2023 and the availability has fallen and planned flying hours have fallen. That record is significant to one partner who is contemplating decades of business, as it will transform the decision to buy into the decision to hang on to, decisions that are won or lost in spares, depot capacity, software maintenance and workforce depth.
Simultaneously, the aircraft that Canada would get during this period is not inert. Lockheed Martin, in its F-35 program manager terms the F-35 F-35 Tech Refresh 3 hardware and software baseline as the foundation of the Block 4 modernization package, which is defined as having better sensors, better sensor fusion, and better weapons integration, which are precisely what define interoperability and survivability in dense and networked air-defense environments.
The procurement dynamism seen in contracts, facilities and mission-data integration leaves less room to make a pivot. The file is more and more like a decision being carried out in phases: no one dramatic proclamation, but a progression of engineering, industrial, and preparatory actions which has Canada in the queue with a fleet sufficient to guarantee long-term NORAD credibility.
