The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet has not secured its position on the supercarrier by posing as a stealth fighter; it does the ugly work that allows a carrier air wing to work effectively; it launches a lot, turns fast, carries heavy, and attaches itself to the sensors of all others. The combination of the latter with low observability does not replace the combat multiplier provided by that combination, in a force constructed around sea-based aviation.
The jet came at the beginning of 2000s as a carrier-based multirole aircraft, and its worth has always been quantified in terms of availability and sortie generation. It was constructed to concentrate missions that used to be in many forms of legacy and that pragmatic design approach is evident today where it is needed most, at the flight deck, in harsh maritime conditions and with crews attempting to maintain aircraft turning under tight cyclic operations.
It is the gradual transformation into a network fight that altered the relevance of the Super Hornet to contemporary threats, rather than one particular upgrade that was the “silver bullet.” The APG-79 AESA radar reduced the awareness gap to more advanced fighters as it had longer detection ranges, and multi-target tracking, and also provided electronic attack support. During the Block III period, mission systems of the aircraft were oriented more toward connectivity and processing, such as the Distributed Targeting Processor Network (DTP-N), Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT), and making the jet a cooperative shooter and relay node instead of a lone hunter. Practically, it translates to the ability of a Super Hornet to inherit targeting capability elsewhere, such as E-2D, F-35C, Aegis ships and concentrate on providing weapons volumetric capability.
The label of that “missile truck” is not figurative. Capacity is the signature capability of the Super Hornet: it can be loaded in more than 17,700 pounds of ordnance to be deployed as fleet defense or strike or maritime attack or mixed loads that change with tasking. The flexibility of the platform is more applicable, as the air combat evolves towards the concept of weapon range and target accuracy rather than close range actions. A recent test-based instance highlighted the extreme end of that reasoning, where a VX-9 F/A-18F was captured with four AIM-174B missiles aboard as well as AIM-120s and AIM-9Xs-an air-to-air weapon package that prioritizes range and ammunition capacity at the expense of drag and tanker capacity.
The degree to which incremental upgrades can be effective has an upper limit and the experience of the Navy with range-enhancing add-ons demonstrates it. The service gave a stop-work order on conformal fuel tanks following carrier-environment problems that were associated with “cost, schedule, and performance,” and presented a capability gap that longer-legged concepts were designed to solve. Meanwhile, the solution to range of the carrier air wing is becoming more and more architectural, as opposed to bolt-on: enhanced offboard sensing, enhanced connectivity, and tanking capability, such as the MQ-25 program.
Half the survivability of Super Hornet is not the plane, but the electronic warfare ecosystem surrounding the plane. The stand-off jamming and radar suppression capability of the EA-18G Growler alters the visibility and tracking space of the opposing sensors, opening gaps in which non-stealth aircraft have the opportunity to survive and play. As the F-35C moves forward in greater-threat airspace to conduct reconnaissance and targeting, the Super Hornet can be left to follow-on as the “muscle” to provide massed weapons and defensive counter-air to the wider force to manage the risk.
That is the point of division of labor. The Super Hornet does not often have to win by remaining invisible, but rather by being there, by being many, and being equipped, and having the air wing around it to grant it first sight and long time to shoot.
