In the case of an airplane that did not go to actual service, the YF-23 manages to start an argument.
The Black Widow II continues to exist within the aviation culture since its defeat cannot be brought down to a beauty competition between two forms of stealth planes. The more robust problem is the type of air superiority the plane alluded to- superiority that was established prior to a merge and not demonstrated following a merger. The speed, range and low observability of the YF-23 was not an addition to an old fighter formula in that framing; it was the formula. It presupposed that the first to spot and the first to attack would have the crucial part in the conflict, and survivability would be provided by being denied the chance to become a target instead of out-turning an adversary.
In the flyoff of the Advanced Tactical Fighter, agility at the closest level was still a non-negotiable by the Air Force. The two-dimensional thrust-vectoring nozzles on the YF-22 provided the type of pitch control that enabled maneuvers at a high angle-of-attack and provided an assurance to the evaluators in case of an emergency within the visual range. The YF-23, in contrast, was willing to make other tradeoffs. Its set up to exhaust prevented any post-stall theatrics which were unsuitable to its fixed exhaust system, instead being suited to signature control and effective supersonic flight, which were considered the most significant maneuver of the battlespace, since being visible was never the goal.
Timing was the more serious issue. The logic behind the functioning of the YF-23 relied on an ecosystem that was not yet operational at scale: long-range sensing, and strong data-sharing and the capacity to distribute awareness and risk outside the cockpit. That implied the jet requested the institution to transform with the technology-doctrine, basing assumptions, tanker dependency, training focus, and sustainment habits- as budgets shrank and strategic focus faded. In such an environment, it was not laziness to choose a platform that fit, but risk management.
A history of the program also demonstrates the closeness with which the competition was framed in terms of time, confidence, and demonstrations, not merely mere promise. The test of the YF-23 was forceful including its qualification as an air refueler on its fourth flight and it soon ventured into speedy performance. The same record included real-world friction such as windscreen cracking at Mach 1.5, engine and fuel-system problems in the second prototype, the problems, which are tolerable in a prototype but, nevertheless, creates an image of maturity and production risk when a service is making a choice it will live with decades.
The Air Force felt like it was purchasing an integrated weapon system, which is what those maturity questions were supported by. The YF-22 was generally perceived as being more production-ready and more flexible as a long-term platform and the design was such, that it could be expanded in both avionics and in mission flexibility. The larger industrial and political presence behind the YF-22 team also contributed, in that even the best idea yet has to withstand the process of appropriation and industrial relations.
When the future air supremacy is to be presented as a “family of systems,” as opposed to a single jet, the YF-23 appears in its long shadow. The continuity between the assumptions of the Black Widow II and the contemporary focus on platforms being nodes where persistence, signature management and standoff awareness determine what is feasible is difficult to overlook. The point the YF-23 continues to drive is not what prototype was more appealing on a ramp, but what types of institutional change will receive funding early, and which types of institutional change will only be funded after becoming inevitable.
