Artemis II makes the Moon a rules-and-routines contest, not a single heroic win

The most consequential aspect of Artemis II is not its destination, but that which it normalizes: the recurring human activities beyond low earth orbit, which will be observable by partners and competitors who will use routines as precedent.

Image Credit to wikipedia.org

The lunar missions of the Apollo era were constructed to be used in the critical moments- firsts that could be broadcast, met, and banked. The drama succeeded in strengthening capability and national pride even when Apollo 13 circled the Moon in 1970 following an explosion in one of the oxygen tanks. Artemis II, which is intended as a crewed loop around the far side of the Moon, is located in a different landscape: congested, commercially sucked into it, more and more influenced by how space actors think the others should act.

The mission profile of Artemis II is not impressive since it lacks landing. However, the tactical burden is in what flight to cislunar demands: access to reliable life support, navigation, communications, and operational discipline among a number of organizations. Such requirements make one mission a coordinating location to supply chains, schedules and partner commitments. In that regard, Artemis II serves as a stepping-stone to subsequent surface operations, as the confidence that a human deep-space cadence can be maintained, and not just an effort to do so, was built.

One can better see the transformation against the backdrop of the long-horizon architecture of China. The International Lunar Research Station plans envisage an initial south polar base which is planned to be completed circa 2035 near the lunar south pole, with an extended network proposal being proposed towards the middle of the century. The technical specificity of those ideas, power systems, communications, surface mobility, alludes to an incremental build-up model where infrastructure is the most prominent indicator of purpose.

Governance questions are, however, governed by infrastructure extracted out of the abstract. The most disputed geography of the Moon is not a geographical boundary, but the engineering limitations: permanently shadowed craters which are able to trap volatiles, and neighboring ridges where the sun is well-positioned to generate power. The focus lies on water ice as it can sustain life support and propellant generation and one such piece of evidence is the LCROSS impact findings that recorded 5.6 ± 2.9 wt.% water in the ejecta plume. With operators crowding around the south pole, “due regard” to the rules of the 1967 Treaty on the Outer Space slides the principle of diplomacy into that of operation: who has the right to work where, and is that too near, and what is interference.

It is there that the effort of Artemis Accords to realize deconfliction begins to come into play. Accords have grown to 50 signatory nations, and it has the concept of “safety zones” as a viable measure to avoid detrimental interference. A recurring point of contention in space law scholarship has been over protective zones, of balancing the safety requirements with the principle of non-appropriation; one of the recent frameworks is the provision of how the safety zone is subjected to the non-appropriation principle of the duty of avoiding harmful interference of Article IX, but the concern of quasi-exclusive control has also been raised.

Meanwhile, proposals of governance are becoming more tangible than high-level norms. In an article in PNAS in 2024, it is suggested that there is no intergovernmental power to regulate lunar mining, and an offer of a “Lunar Mining Code” with a notification regime to regulate prospecting and an exploration license system to govern exploration license, with the express purpose of ensuring an orderly and fair access. The same work recommends that spatial planning tools, block-based mapping and registries, should be used to render coordination more realistic than idealistic.

Then Artemis II is not a homesick throwback to Apollo. It is an expression of the fact that the United States is ready to compete using alliances, interoperability and operating practices that can be duplicated, exactly the sort of behavior that, over a period of time, will transform vaguely stated treaty language into the first order rulebook of the Moon.

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