Fitting a Bradley with survivability kits can result in 3,000 pounds, and only one figure would justify why an active protection system selection is more important than it initially seems.
The Bradley Fighting Vehicle has survived decades of improvements that have made it deadlier and more interconnected and has also narrowed the vehicle margins in the one area modernization can never narrow, size, weight, and power. It is precisely there that the tension of Iron Fist falls. The decision of the U.S. Army to proceed with Elbit hard-kill system is not really about the pursuit of an ideal shield but an attempt to provide the proper defense layer to the platform that has very little “give” remaining.
Iron “fit” is planned to sense and overcome the incoming threats before making any contact with it by following radar and electro-optical sensors with quick-reaction interceptors. The technical pitch in the Bradley context has remained the same, namely, relatively low weight, small size in terms of installation, and coverage that is designed to deal with the type of close-in, high-tempo threat environment that armored infantry has had to deal with. That is rocket-propelled grenades, guided anti-armor missiles, but also the ever-growing list of aerial and top-down threats that the vehicle was not initially designed to deal with. The design aim of Iron Fist is wide-spanning: hemispherical 360 coverage and an engagement concept that interferes or neutralizes the incoming projectile with the help of an interceptor that explosively detonates close to the target.
The argument of that, fit is not abstract. The previous Army assessments of integrability of an APS paid much attention to whether it would be possible to implement the APS without forcing the Bradley into the operational penalty that offset the protection gains- turret balance issues, power availability, maintainability, and crew workload. During live-fire test, the Iron Fist Light Decoupled system proved to be more durable and effective with Maj. Gen. Glenn Dean stating that “The Army is very pleased with the improved performance of this system.” He said, “The software improvements since 2018 are more consistent and stable.” The interceptors installed on the system aim to be exploded next to an object of threat and not on the vehicle itself, which should minimize the secondary impact on both the platform and troops.
It is also through the choice that APS has come a long way, out of being an exotic addition, to a fundamental design assumption. The hard-kill system exists in a complex intermediate between armored systems and electronic countermeasures: it requires sensors able to categorize threats within seconds, algorithms capable of not wasting shots on misses, and effectors capable of countering the incoming round without posing an intolerable risk to the vehicle. The broader family of Iron Fist has been offered on other platforms beyond the Bradley, as CV90 variants and other armored vehicles meaning that modern APS is being considered more of a modular equipment and not a one-off.
There is a second plotline running under the iron fist option: the vehicle the Army has is still the Bradley, as it attempts to construct the vehicle it desires. Replacement programs have failed several times and the XM30 program is designed to avoid much of those historical traps with open architecture, automation and power growth being built into it. The Bradley, in its turn, will have to “buy back” headroom where it is possible, by adding enhancements to the engines and the transmission, improving cooling and electrical systems, and digital backbones that can accommodate new sensors and defensive suites without necessarily compelling ongoing rework.
At that, fielding Iron Fist is a step in a direction with an advantage of an engineer. It will provide a reactive layer that will allow the Bradley to remain applicable to more aggressive missions, but will also fit in the longer-term trend of the Army toward modular protection structures, including modular active protection system (MAPS) approach.
The Bradley might be well over its tapers, but the choice demonstrates that the Army is still eager to invest the effort of integration in the location where the vehicle sells the most survivability per pound- and where the vehicle can actually assimilate the modification.
