But the carrier remains the U.S. Navy’s most visible manifestation of sea power in the Pacific. The most enduring Chinese response has become equally visible in idea, if not always in practice: to create a layered defense that detects the carrier early, keeps it engaged in defending itself, and then threatens it with enough different courses of attack that time and distance become the real weapons.
This strategy can be distilled down to three weapons: drones, missiles, and submarines, but the appeal is in how they can leverage each other. Unmanned systems expand the search volume and reduce the time between detection and engagement. Missiles provide range and speed. Submarines introduce uncertainty and endurance, forcing carrier strike groups to allocate limited sensors, escorts, and aircraft to defend against the submarine threat while the air threat hangs overhead.
On the missile side of the equation, the hard nose is no longer simply the concept of “carrier killers,” but rather the engineering of a kill chain. China has developed anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D and DF-26, which are intended to attack large surface ships at long range. At sea, the Type 055 Renhai-class destroyers, with a full load displacement of 13,000 tons and 112 VLS cells, offer range and flexibility, particularly as the maturity of ship-launched hypersonic strike capabilities is achieved. “Finalization testing” of the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile launch from a Type 055 has been shown in official PLAN imagery, a type of ship built to integrate long-range air defense with land-attack and anti-ship missions. The YJ-20’s apparent design concept of high terminal velocity, maneuverable flight trajectories, and a seeker transition near the end game aims directly at the same U.S. strength that carriers depend on: staying mobile and protected by layered defenses.
The submarine leg of the fight is developing beyond “subs in the vicinity.” The newer nuclear submarines that China is building are intended to be more difficult to detect, and this alone will affect the behavior of a carrier strike group before a single round is fired. There has been open-source information about a focus on quieter designs and new hull shapes, including the Type 096 ballistic missile submarine, as well as attack submarine development, such as the Type 093B. Whether for sea denial or as a “stalking horse” threat that makes routing more difficult, a more survivable submarine force will drive the need for constant ASW, and geography and time are unkind there.
Drones occupy the gaps between these layers.
The Chinese effort also involves ideas that appear less like individual works of art UAVs and more like distributed launch capabilities “mothership” concepts, swarming weapons, and naval unmanned systems designed to extend surveillance and multiply target points. Among these is the Jiu Tian “drone mothership” concept, said to be capable of carrying numerous smaller UAVs. Even where detail is unclear, the operational imperative is simple: overwhelm shipboard radar, engage repeatedly, and exhaust interceptors at a rate that outstrips replenishment.
The growing U.S. response is to stretch defenses without emptying magazines. Missiles like SM-3 and SM-6 are still core, but the math gets dicey when the threats come in mixed salvos. Directed energy is touted as a way to change the math. A report by the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, released in January, showed HELIOS on board USS Preble firing in 2024 to engage an aerial drone, connecting the notion of “unlimited shots” to a tested engagement capability rather than a theoretical one.
In each of the three levers, the point of balance is access. If sea lines of communication must be extended beyond the first island chain to mitigate risk, the rate of sorties and time to effect will increase just the sort of delay an A2/AD environment is intended to create while China seeks to enhance its own blue-water access and the infrastructure that underpins it.
