In modern warfare, the days when there is a “safe” rear area are soon to become a thing of the past. It is clear in the strike that took place in Ukraine recently that targeted a Russian armored recovery vehicle that is well inside enemy territory that the effects that UAVs are having on warfare. In the past, the role that knocked-out armored vehicles have played has been a risk-free mission that has required very minimal planning. It is now a gamble that is being done while being watched from above.
In this case, what was required was a recovery vehicle of BREM series, which is an extremely valuable asset that also has the ability to transport tanks that have been damaged to an extent that they can be repaired. These kinds of equipment are extremely difficult to replace because the Russians have lost over 120 BREM variants in the conflict that is currently underway. The loss of one BREM may result in a delay in repairing several combat vehicles.
This attack is carried out by a group named the Ivan Franko Group in Ukraine using the first-person view (FPV) of the drones in hunting and attacking the target. Video footage of the attack of the target includes different passes of the attack, with the last FPV of the attack chasing the BREM trying to escape the attack. The use of different attack drones in an attack indicates that the attack of different drones has been adopted in Ukraine.
FPV drones have proved their efficacy and limitations that go along with it too. FPV drones have the potential for carrying out precision strike power at a minimal cost of effort, entering through the hatch or hitting a relocating target, though the success ratio is very low. The operatives have stated that the success ratio for confirmed strike success lies between 20–30% of sorties, with the remaining due to weather/tech or EW failure.
The threat in the case of electronic warfare always exists. The percentage in some units in the Ukrainian army in intercepted FPV tasks was 31% of FPV missions. The Russians have developed fiber optics drones that have no jamming ability, with ultrathin fiber optics spooled out during flight. The Ukrainian government has been attempting to produce as many fiber optics as they can, although they have limitations in their supply chain, particularly foreign components.
However, behind all these wars, an industry war is taking place. The Ukrainian government has invested largely in drone development, including investments in the production of at least one million FPV drones, in addition to their ability to produce 4 million annually by 2024. The impact of this development is that deep strikes, just experienced in the BREM attack, will no longer be exceptional. This has been the impact of an even bigger adaptation by the Ukrainians.
The Ukrainians have adapted to learning to launch drone attacks in an even bigger way that has identified that ‘logistics’ are indeed valid yet poor target strategies. The Ukrainians have been attacking the ‘recovery vehicles,’ ‘logistics vehicles,’ and ‘point of repairs’ of their enemies in an effort to dismantle ‘the fabric’ that sustains their effective ‘combat forces’ of the ‘Ukrainians.’ In this particular setting, ‘the kill zone’ might just reach six to nine miles away, in addition to miles away, away from ‘the battlefront.’
However, behind all these implications, this trend has implications that go far away from this particular conflict taking place in ‘Ukraine.’ As unmanned systems proliferate in the battlespace, the distinction between combat and support units becomes less clear-cut. Of course, this indicates that all ‘the soldiers’ behind ‘the battlefront’ will have to start acting just like all ‘the others’ in their line, including ‘the ideas’ of ‘concealment,’ ‘deception,’ ‘and counter-drone’ strategies in their ‘operations.’ The BREM strike attack is one particular example in which ‘the defeat’ behind ‘the battlefront,’ following a small drone attack, will have ‘the capacity’ to impact ‘the battlefront.’
As the pace of this new calculus of war accelerates, it’s not just high-priced missiles and manned aircraft that offer precision. Increasingly, it is being deployed through the use of small, remote-control devices that are launched miles away by people who will never set foot on the warfront. And, of course, as has been shown through the context of the conflict in the Ukraine, when mass production is paired with creativity on the part of the military, even the most mundane task related to military maintenance can become “highly vulnerable.”
