“Superiority in space is a measure of national vision and willpower,” says this latest executive order, which calls for an aggressive schedule that could mean calling into question U.S. space policy for generations to come. Issued on Dec. 18, this order establishes goals that include returning humans to the Moon by 2028, developing lunar infrastructure, also in 2028, and placing a nuclear reactor on the Moon’s surface, also in 2028. Yet these challenges are not to be viewed as mere isolated events, but as part of a greater scheme to achieve U.S. supremacy over space and Low Earth Orbit.

The lunar nuclear reactor project, formally known as “National Initiative for American Space Nuclear Power,” would supply reliable, high-power energy for long-duration and surface missions. NASA’s Fission Surface Power production designs are intended for at least a decade of operation at 10 kilowatts of electrical power using uranium fuel and passively cooled designs to withstand the extreme lunar temperature variations. These reactors would enable a permanent presence, in-situ resource utilization, and high-data rate communication operations independently of intermittent solar power in the shaded areas of the poles. The directive requires the issuance of implementation guidance by the Office of Science and Technology Policy within 60 days in recognition of the need.
It also redefines national security space architecture in order to safeguard U.S. interests in Earth orbit through the cislunar environment. In this regard, the DoD must design and demonstrate prototypes of next-generation missile defense architectures starting from the “Golden Dome” initiative by 2028. This multi-tiered umbrella network will be composed of an operational space-interceptor constellation alongside other terrestrial-based programs, Aegis, Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, THAAD, as well as Patriot missile batteries. “that technology exists what we have not proven is can I do it economically; and at scale?” stated Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein. This is knowing that large-scale execution will drive projected expenditures well in excess of $500 billion during two decades.
The executive order also brings commercial space capabilities into the framework of defense, which is a shift in strategy and has been identified within the congressional mandate for a strategy for space security over the past thirty years in the US. The use of commercial space innovation such as Reusable Space Launch Systems, Synthetic Aperture Radar Constellations, and Optical Laser Communications has been proposed to improve defense space capabilities.
The use of such capabilities will require changes in acquisition and focus on OTAs and SAAs to quickly procure and bring new firms into the space market for national security. The region’s favorable geography, with Earth-Moon Lagrange points providing stable sites for observation, communication, and resource exploitation, makes the cislunar space very visible in the defense arrangements within the order. These points will also likely become contested regions as China and Russia press on with their own lunar and cislunar developments. At the same time, the guidance emphasizes the need for increased collaboration on basing arrangements, joint investments, and collective security operations with partners to underpin freedom of action. Continuous mobility through on-orbit refueling, autonomous mission rendezvous, and repositioning will become essential for underpinning operational momentum within challenging threat spaces.
The civil side not only mentions that NASA must report a plan within 90 days on how the objectives for exploration can be accomplished in a way that reduces technology gaps and vulnerabilities in the supply chain. It formalizes the retirement of the International Space Station by the year 2030 and the transition to commercially run stations. It aligns with requirements that include encouraging at least $50 billion in additional investments for the U.S. space markets by 2028. It would further accelerate the pace of launches and re-entries by enhancing infrastructure and changes in space market regulations.
Changes on spectrum management that allow the Commerce Department to seek fees for the coordination services for civil space traffic management presumably imply that the changes are aimed at a cost recovery mechanism and may highlight greater capabilities for space situational awareness. The international aspect necessitates that current civilian space frameworks must be examined for alignments with the priorities for the United States and forces a leveraged start, adjustment, or even cancellation for any particular relationship that is considered suitable.
This implies that international frameworks for space governance have to be formulated in a manner that signifies adaptations regarding the challenges currently posed by a world that is multi-polar and has a new shift from a discovery-centric era for space exploration as largely dominated by security and commerce scenarios for space resource usage. The directive has a very ambitious agenda that forces the United States to earmark commanding heights in the realm of space in a world where international competition is intensifying at a much faster pace. There is a link between exploration for the moon and the deployment of nuclear power.

