The most lethal threat to a low-flying helicopter over Ukraine today will cost less than a washing machine. Drones with first-person view (FPV), made from commercial parts and equipped with explosive payloads, have again and again hit Russian rotary-winged aircraft, compelling an instant reappraisal of airborne protection. In response, Russia’s VNII “Gradient” has introduced “Multik,” a small-sized counter-UAV system that is intended to jam the control and video communications of such drones before they can get too close.
FPV drones use analog radio frequencies, usually between 700 MHz and 6 GHz, to broadcast live video to pilots wearing immersive goggles. This allows pilots the accuracy to navigate drones through open hatchways or into moving cars. But the same unencrypted signals expose them to directional jamming. “Multik” takes advantage of this vulnerability by identifying those channels and sending them directed jamming, cutting off the operator’s control and navigation signal. To technical requirements, the equipment can recognize signals as far as 1,000 meters and jam them with a range of 500 meters, given a 2-watt transmitter on the target drone.
Mobility and integration are the engineering focus. Weighing less than 9.5 kilograms, “Multik” has the capability to be installed on vehicles or helicopters, drawing power from a 27V onboard source with a maximum draw of 350 watts. Three independent jamming channels enable simultaneous handling of multiple threats, while 360-degree azimuth coverage prevents blind spots. This is essential for helicopters like the Mi-8/17, which typically fly in contested air and are unable to depend solely on evasive actions or height to escape drone attacks.
The tactical logic is apparent. FPV drones have been hard to defend against with conventional air defenses; they have low radar cross-section and flight profiles, and their expense often in the range of $500 makes them disposable. They have been employed by Ukrainian operators not just for precision missions but also in “double-tap” missions, to follow up artillery or mortar fire with a drone strike to guarantee destruction. As described by one experienced FPV pilot, electronic interference is the most successful means of bringing them down in flight, but only with systems that are tuned to their operating frequencies and able to respond in seconds.
Electronic warfare principles form the basis for “Multik’s” design. By producing high-power radio frequency noise inside the drone’s control band, the system overpowers the receiver’s ability to filter out the operator’s signal. This is pure spot jamming, where power is focused on a very limited frequency band to achieve optimal disruption effectiveness. With the dense electromagnetic environment of the front lines where several friendly and enemy drones could be vying for scarce channels such precision targeting is necessary to prevent collateral interference on allied platforms.
The use of “Multik” also shows a bigger Russian effort to harden air assets against the growing drone threat. Platforms such as the Mi-8MTPR-1 Rychag helicopter, designed to jam radars on surface-to-air missiles, counter long-range threats from air defense systems. “Multik” occupies another niche: close-range, omnidirectional defense against small, high-speed, manually controlled UAVs. Its small size and mobility-compatible design make it possible for it to follow helicopters into forward positions, or escort convoys and mobile command centers.
From a purely engineering point of view, the issue is one of balancing power output against dimensions and energy use. Operating at a minimum power radiated of 25 watts per channel, “Multik” must deliver adequate signal power to overwhelm the drone’s link without destroying the host platform’s electrical system. Directed interference instead of broad-band barrage jamming saves energy and minimizes collateral interference to other communications.
How soon “Multik” can be deployed and incorporated into doctrine will determine whether it can effectively neutralize FPV drone attacks. Ukrainian troops have already tested fiber-optic-guided drones that are resistant to radio jamming, but these are still constrained by cost and agility. Meanwhile, the majority of FPV threats continue to use radio links, and technologies like “Multik” offer a potentially useful defense against exposed aircraft. In a battlespace where even helicopters need to defend themselves against gear cobbled together in garages, electronic warfare is increasingly as important as armor or velocity.
