In one night, Ukraine’s military intelligence achieved what decades of eroding attrition had not destroying two of Russia’s precious Beriev Be-12 amphibious planes in occupied Crimea, a strike that potentially reduced the operational fleet by almost half. The September 21 raid, launched by the HUR’s “Ghosts” special forces, also disabled a Mi-8 helicopter, highlighting Ukraine’s ability to penetrate deep into Russia’s naval aviation assets despite the peninsula’s multi-layered defenses.
The Be-12 “Chaika” (Seagull), which flew initially in 1960, was a Cold War workhorse constructed by the Beriev Design Bureau to supplant the Be-6 flying boat. Its high-set gull wing, twin end-plate fins, and tricycle landing gear enabled smooth transitions between coastal airstrips and open water. Propelled by two Ivchenko AI-20D turboprops with 5,180 shaft horsepower each, the plane could fly 530–610 kilometers per hour, patrol 7,500 kilometers, and fly at 8,000 meters. It was designed to conduct anti-submarine warfare and was equipped with the APM-73S magnetic anomaly detector in a tail boom, thimble nose-mounted Initsiava-2BN search radar, and hydroacoustic buoys’ dispensers, its armament varying from homing torpedoes to depth charges.
Through 2023, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet had only six Be-12s in search-and-rescue configuration, with seven or eight airframes observed at Kacha air base by satellite imagery four or five thought airworthy. Attrition of two operational units in a single strike takes rare sensors, experienced crews, and irreplaceable spares out of a fleet that is no longer being produced. As Alexander Lord of Sibylline put it, “Russia doesn’t have many Be-12s, and while they are old aircraft, their anti-submarine capabilities are likely useful in identifying Ukrainian drone threats.”
Those threats are increasingly being posed by Ukraine’s growing number of unmanned surface vessels (USVs), led by the Magura V5 and V7 series. The Magura V5’s low-profile carbon-fiber body, waterjet propulsion, and 400+ nautical mile range make detection hard until perilously close. Equipped with as much as 705 pounds of explosive power, these USVs have sunk corvettes, landing craft, and even taken down helicopters with modified R-73 air-to-air missiles. The larger V7 model, featuring 800 nm range and the ability to carry AIM-9 Sidewinders, took down two Russian Su-30 fighters in May 2025. This development is emblematic of the Jeune École naval doctrine’s focus on speed, quantity, and asymmetric attacks to deprive sea control.
The Be-12’s recent deployments have changed from Cold War-era submarine tracking to detecting USVs threatening Russian ports and installations. However, as The Hague Center for Security Studies’ Frederik Mertens noted, the plane is “a bit of a relic,” not equipped with modern radar and infrared systems to detect small, high-speed drones. Its destruction at Kacha mirrors the wider weakening of Russia’s anti-access/area denial position in the Black Sea, where Ukraine has integrated USVs, coastal defense cruise missiles, and precision aerial drones to drive Sevastopol out of the Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk.
Ukraine’s naval strategy has also used the R-360 Neptune missile family, whose initial anti-ship version destroyed the cruiser Moskva in 2022. The new “Long Neptune” adds up to 1,000 kilometers of range with conformal fuel tanks and a 260 kg warhead, using better satellite guidance and infrared homing for terminal guidance in electronic warfare scenarios. These missiles allow for attacks against high-value targets far beyond shore-based A2/AD defenses, in support of USV raids in a layered strategy.
Rear Admiral Mike Mattis of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa emphasized how Ukraine’s adoption of unmanned systems has cost “cost at low cost to ourselves” and established a sea denial area that “effectively denied [Russia]” access to northwest Black Sea territory. The destruction of the Be-12s follows this trend striking reconnaissance assets available to cue defenses for incoming USVs, thus extending the gap in Russia’s maritime situational awareness.
The loss for Russia, however, is not only tactical. Amphibious aircraft such as the Be-12 also enable overwatch of grain and oil export routes, a function integral to the Black Sea’s role in the economy. With fewer patrols available, Ukraine’s naval drones have greater scope to operate, further diminishing Russia’s ability to project power out of Crimea. Technically, the strike wipes out a very unusual transitional maritime aviation a flying machine whose hydrodynamic hull and amphibious versatility remained state-of-the-art decades after its peak, until new unmanned warfare eventually caught up.
