“The best place to destroy a Shahed is on the ground.” This truism, borrowed from a recent CSIS report, takes on fresh relevance following a series of precisely calculated Ukrainian attacks that have rattled Russian military facilities from the Pacific to the Voronezh region.
During the early morning of July 5, a series of explosions outside Vladivostok set fires along the central gas pipeline and destroyed a water supply line newly commissioned and vitally important to the combat readiness of the Russian Pacific Fleet’s 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. As Ukrainian intelligence quoted by RBC-Ukraine reported, the damaged gas pipeline was recently introduced into service in March 2025, highlighting the fragility of even the newest additions to Russia’s military logistics network. The water pipeline, which was required for the support of garrisons on the Sea of Japan, was also destroyed, halting basic military support. Russian officials reacted by immediately sending emergency teams and, in an attempt to hold back information, briefly shutting down mobile internet and communications within the region a step that emphasizes the psychological and operational effect of such attacks.
Such attacks are not unique. Only weeks before, another blast struck the brigade’s supply lines at Desantnaya Bay, which demonstrates a series of attacks designed to erode the resilience of Russia’s Far Eastern military supply chains. The striking of key energy and water infrastructure betrays an advanced appreciation of pipeline susceptibility a factor that, as discussed in a recent review of oil and gas pipeline vulnerability analysis, encompasses not only the material weakness of pipeline welds and materials but also the systemic exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity of the full supply chain. Disruptions here have a cascade effect, impacting everything from fuel supplies for cars and generators to troops’ everyday food supplies.
At the same time, Ukraine attacked Borisoglebsk air base in Voronezh, which is a main center for Russia’s sophisticated Su-34, Su-35S, and Su-30SM fighter aircraft. The Ukrainian General Staff said the attack damaged a guided aerial bomb warehouse and at least one combat training aircraft, satellite imagery verifying fires at the facility. Earlier strikes on this airbase had already hit hangars, fuel depots, and planes, but the July 5 operation is notable for targeting storage for munitions as well as aircraft readiness. The elimination of glide bomb inventories is especially important, since those weapons have played a key role in Russia’s recent air campaigns against Ukrainian cities.
The security and safety measures for the storage of such weaponry are in focus once again. Contemporary glide bombs need to be stored under specific conditions to avoid being detonated accidentally and to shield them from sabotage or pinpoint strikes. The repeated attacks on these targets point to possible vulnerabilities in Russian base hardening as well as perimeter defense, or even an underestimation of Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities.
These strikes came against the background of a unrelenting drone war. Russia also sent 322 drones and decoys into Ukraine on the same evening, the Ukrainian air force reported. 157 of them were destroyed, and 135 were lost, probably due to electronic jamming. This drone saturation strategy, pioneered with mass-produced Shahed-type drones, is designed to overwhelm air defenses through sheer volume and attrition. As the CSIS report explains, Russia’s dependence on Shaheds is based on attrition logic: Each drone costs approximately $20,000–$50,000, whereas even a single modern surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery or interceptor missile can cost several hundred thousand dollars.
Ukraine’s response has evolved rapidly, leveraging layered air defense systems, acoustic sensors, and integrated command networks to drive up interception rates and cut the cost-per-kill. Electronic warfare has also become a vital capability, with both sides using sophisticated jamming and spoofing capabilities. Russian drones have evolved, now equipped with 16-element CRPA antennas and real-time telemetry to counter jamming and enhance survivability. The future already seen in recent strikes includes AI-based, fully autonomous drones that can evade electronic countermeasures and pick out targets autonomously.
China’s own recent developments track the escalation of counter-drone electronic warfare, which is integrated in a multi-layered defense architecture consisting of phased-array radars, AI-fused sensor fusion, and directed-energy weapons in the form of high-power microwave and lasers. The PLA’s “Tianqiong” is a prime example of this development, integrating radar, jamming, and directed-energy countermeasures into one network that is automated.
As the Russia–Ukraine war begins its fourth year, the attacks on Vladivostok pipelines and Borisoglebsk air base signal a turning point to attacking the logistical and technological foundations of military might. Each one of these attacks, each intercepted drone, each jammed transmission exposes not just the vulnerabilities of new-age warfare, but the constant innovation of both attackers and defenders in a rapidly shifting battlespace.
