Is the US-Russia battle for control of the Arctic being won not through missiles, but by the sheen of radar-absorbent coatings and the US Air Force’s turboprop whine? The July 22 intercepting of Russian Tu-95MS bombers by U.S. Air Force F-16Cs and F-35As in the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) provides a telling look at the technical and strategic dance unfolding in the far north.
The event, verified by NORAD, played out in excess of three hours as a pair of Russian Tu-95MS “Bear-H” bombers, accompanied by Su-35S fighters, crossed into the ADIZ but did not enter U.S. or Canadian territory, thereby not infringing on U.S. or Canadian sovereignty. NORAD responded with a layered force: two F-35As, four F-16Cs, an E-3 Sentry for command and control, and three KC-135 tankers, highlighting the preparedness and depth of North American air defense. “This Russian activity in the contiguous U.S./Alaskan ADIZ occurs regularly and is not seen as a threat,” the command said, reiterating that the ADIZ is a buffer, not a border, to the sovereign airspace, but a zone in which all aircraft must be identified for national security reasons NORAD uses a layered defense system of satellites, ground-based and airborne radar, and fighter aircraft.
The Tu-95MS, a Cold War-era Bear’s modernized successor, is a technical wonder in itself. Its four turboprop Kuznetsov NK-12MP engines, each powering eight-bladed contra-rotating propellers, provide a maximum range of as much as 15,000 kilometers and a cruise speed of 650 km/h. The bomber can be loaded with a maximum of 15,000 kg of weapons, six Kh-55 nuclear cruise missiles or eight Kh-101 conventional cruise missiles, and has advanced navigation, electronic warfare, and air defense systems, including the SPS-160 Geran jamming system and twin-barrelled GSh-23L autocannon in the rear turret The Tu-95MS Bear-H bomber is equipped with two Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-23 twin-barrelled, 23mm rear-mounted automatic cannons. Recent modernization under the Tu-95MSM program has added further improvements to avionics, radar, and engine dependability, making the Bear remain effective as a strategic deterrent and cruise missile platform the modernization is broken down into two phases. including the new Novella NV1.021 passive electronically scanned array radar installation.
The July patrol was not an isolated incident, but part of a larger trend of Russian strategic bomber activity in the Arctic. More and more, these missions are flown in coordination with China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force, whose H-6K bombers were part of a joint patrol in the vicinity of Alaska in July 2024 with Tu-95s. China’s Ministry of National Defense says these flights are designed to further test and enhance the level of cooperation between the two air forces, as well as deepen strategic mutual trust and practical cooperation between the two countries. The bomber flights, which brought the planes within 200 miles of Alaska’s coast, are evidence of Moscow and Beijing’s desire to project power and challenge U.S. resolve in the Pacific and Arctic, even as both emphasize respect for international law the bombers were within 200 miles of Alaska’s coast.
For the U.S. Air Force, technical superiority in such engagements increasingly depends on stealth and sensor fusion. The F-16Cs used for the interception now carry the Have Glass V coating a ferromagnetic, radar-absorbent coating that lowers the aircraft’s radar cross-section (RCS) from approximately 5m² to a mean of 1.2m². This dark-gray paint, initially used on SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) squadrons, is radar-absorbent and provides time-to-detection delay against enemy systems, providing a key survivability increase for legacy aircraft the new ferromagnetic paint, which is radar-absorbent, first showed up on some of the approximately 200 F-16s. The Have Glass V program, though not providing real stealth, reduces the detection window and maximizes the effectiveness of electronic warfare measures. It will, however, deliver a significant boost to the F-16’s survivability and operational capability, and it promises to deliver a performance advantage over competing fighter aircraft, as reported by aviation analysts.
The F-35A Lightning II, on the other hand, introduces a different order of magnitude for low observability. Its stealth design from all angles, radar-absorbent paint, internal bay mounting of weapons, and sophisticated electronic warfare capability make it a very effective interceptor. The F-35’s RCS is estimated to be approximately 0.0015m², roughly similar to a golf ball, making it difficult for enemies to target and greatly reducing the range at which it can be detected by radar. “The biggest differences in the fifth-generation aircraft and the F-16 is stealth,” said Maj. Christopher Jeffers, a U.S. Air Force F-35 pilot. “It increases the survival rate in missions.” The shape of the F-35 and its sensors, weapons and fuel all combine to make the F-35 stealthy, or ‘low observability’.
NORAD’s interception procedures depend on a “layered defense network” using satellites, ground and airborne radars, and quick-deploy fighter aircraft. When unidentified aircraft are in the ADIZ, fighters are scrambled to visually identify, track, and, if need be, escort the intruders from the area. The July 22 operation proved the capability of this system, with U.S. and Canadian resources operating in concert to provide a visible deterrent and ensure quick response capability NORAD stands ready to utilize a variety of response options in defense of North America.
With Arctic airspace as a stage for great power signaling, the technical specifications stealth coatings, missile carrying capacity, and radar networks are as important as the geopolitical message they convey. The July intercept was no simple test of boundaries, but a demonstration of sharpening capabilities on both sides, with each interception and patrol sharpening the calculus of deterrence on the world’s newest strategic frontier.
