It is not that common that a cruise missile from the 1970s becomes the centerpiece of a 21st-century political crisis, yet Tomahawk has the ability to make history repeat itself. This week, a Russian legislator threatened that Moscow would attack Poland’s Rzeszów military complex if the United States provides the weapon to Ukraine a statement that notes the degree to which a single missile type can have both tactical and strategic implications.
The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, or TLAM, is no ordinary munition. With ranges of as much as 1,600 miles, it can penetrate well into Russia from Ukrainian soil, put Moscow, St. Petersburg, and strategic energy and defense facilities in range. Intended for launch from U.S. Navy ships and submarines, the Tomahawk has since evolved into a number of different variations, such as a restricted ground-launched version through the Typhon missile system. But Ukraine lacks the naval vessels and trained sailors to fire the missile, and the availability of the Typhon to U.S. service eliminates instant deployment as a possibility.
That availability is not just a function of hardware it is a three-decades-long production shortfall. The U.S. Navy has been consuming Tomahawks faster than manufacturers can supply new ones at a two-year lead times and a five-airframe-a-month production rate. As one defense industry executive called it, “This is a case of pathetic, abysmally poor planning,” for years of back-and-forth Pentagon contracts that left producers loath to invest in surge capacity. Even if Washington did approve a transfer to Kyiv, the stockpile available might prove too limited to tip the scales on the battlefield.
The math, however, is not the same from a Russian standpoint. MP Alexey Zhuravlyov cautioned on Russian state television that the Rzeszów hub, from which an estimated 80% of Western military aid to Ukraine moves, might be struck back against. Rzeszów’s Jasionka airport has been a logistic lifeline for NATO since 2022, defended initially by U.S. Patriot systems and now by those of Germany. Its role as the POLLOGHUB is such that it is an important switch point in the defense of NATO’s eastern front, and an attack there would precipitate direct NATO-Russia confrontation.
The Kremlin threat coincides with its new 2024 nuclear doctrine lowering the nuclear threshold to include mass launches of non-nuclear cruise missiles on Russian or Belarusian territory. Tomahawks are such. President Vladimir Putin has already indicated that their use by Ukraine would “crush relations” with Washington, a term applied in Russian strategic thought to designate the threat of spiraling above conventional conflict.
For Ukraine, the Tomahawk represents not just firepower it is a potential strategic wildcard. Ukrainian officials hope that threatening Russian political and economic centers with credible destruction may persuade the Kremlin to reconsider the war. As Serhiy Leshchenko, an assistant to the head of Zelenskyy’s administration, put it, the missile would “a clear signal that we have something to respond with if they continue this terror.” Yet military analysts caution that Russia’s increased dispersal, camouflage, and air defense deployments since 2022 would make the sting useless unless the missiles were delivered in bulk and along with targeting intelligence.
The political obstacles are as formidable as the technical. Past U.S. presidents have been reluctant to provide weapons with ranges to reach into Russia deep, lest they escalate conflict. Even with new policy easing range restrictions on other systems, Tomahawk’s naval roots make transfer logistics difficult. As Hope for Ukraine’s Yuriy Boyechko explained, “Ukraine has a very small navy, and the chances of it acquiring a Tomahawk‑capable surface ship or submarine are nearly zero.”
Meanwhile, NATO’s eastern flank remains on high alert. Poland, already devoting 4.7% of GDP to the military in 2025, fortified its border with American and allied forces, state-of-the-art missile defense, and comprehensive joint exercises. But its proximity to Russian and Belarusian forces and its pivotal role in financing Ukraine’s war machine makes it a top priority target of Russian military communication. The Zapad-2025 exercises, simultaneous with NATO exercises, will likely feature Russia’s new “Oreshnik” ballistic missile, capable of piercing advanced defenses and potentially usable in Belarus.
The Tomahawk debate thus stands at the intersection of industrial capacity, allied politics, and theories of deterrence. It reminds us that in warfare today, choosing to send one weapons system across is not simply a case of range and payload it is a case of the chain of events that triggers when its coordinates are entered.
