Would a combat aircraft intended to destroy Sukhois alter the dynamics of Ukraine’s air war? Almost three years after Russia launched its all-out invasion, neither side has been able to gain air superiority. The explanation is not so much in the numbers of planes as in the air defense density and sophistication spreading across the battlespace. Ukraine’s NASAMS batteries provided by NATO and Russia’s S-400 and S-500 systems have produced what pilots refer to as a “denied environment” in which even fourth-generation advanced fighters fly under constant threat. This two-way aerial denial has lowered the air war to standoff missile attacks, low-level helicopter raids, and brief fighter encounters.
Amid this context, speculation increased over whether Sweden would deploy its JAS 39 Gripen to Ukraine. The Gripen E model is a 4.5-generation multirole fighter that comes with an active electronically scanned array radar, a GE F414 engine, and a heavy-duty electronic warfare package designed to battle Russian radar systems. It was designed from the beginning to be dispersed capable of taking off from 800-meter highways, being refueled and rearmed within 20 minutes by a six-man crew, and operating in harsh climates. This design ethos reflects Ukraine’s own Soviet-derived strategies of moving aircraft to spartan airstrips to prevent loss on the ground.
Royal United Services Institute analysts have characterized the Gripen as by far the most suitable candidate in terms of operational requirements for Ukraine, referencing its low cost of operation $6,000–$8,000 per flight hour and low maintenance requirements. Whereas the F-16 normally needs long, smooth runways and hard shelters, the Gripen was designed to take and fight while always at risk of being missile-engaged. Its integration with the long-range Meteor air-to-air missile, capable of a 80 miles, target kill, provides a reach benefit over much of Russia’s weapons.
Michael Bohnert of RAND says that “Gripens are a way better fit for Ukraine” than F-16s for missions within contested airspace. Ret. U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Gordon “Skip” Davis cites its “big advantage” in electronic warfare, radar signature smallness, and agility against Russia’s very nimble Sukhoi fighters. The plane’s capacity for NATO-standard armaments, such as AIM-120 AMRAAMs and Storm Shadow cruise missiles, would enable Ukraine to broaden its strike options while making Russian air defense planning more difficult.
But the strategic calculation is not solely technical. Sweden’s government has indicated that any Gripen transfer would only be done after the war, at least in part to maintain its own defense preparedness, and in part because it has limited fleet size. Production cycles on new planes are in years, and there is a limited number of available airframes compared to the thousands of F-16s in service worldwide. This shortage constrains the scope for fast delivery and mass deployment, an important consideration when Ukraine’s Air Force commander is projecting a requirement of 96 Gripens to replace its outdated Soviet-era fleet.
Even if Gripens materialized overnight, their effect would be limited by the same joined-up air defense systems that have deterred both Russian and Ukrainian aircraft from air superiority. The lack of fifth-generation stealth jets like the F-35 still a determining element in the deadlock. Although Russian outlets boast the S-400 can shoot down stealth planes, these claims are unfounded, and NATO has not been interested in risking escalation by flying F-35s over Ukraine.
At present, Ukraine’s modernization journey is pinned on the arriving F-16 fleet, supplemented by pledged French Mirage 2000s. The F-16 has the benefit of scale: a huge support ecosystem of spare parts, qualified maintainers, and operational experience within NATO. In comparison, the Gripen has the selling point of being highly customized for Ukraine’s dispersed basing and low-maintenance needs attributes that would make it an excellent postwar platform for a long-term air defense posture against Russia.
The question is whether Ukraine can afford to wait. In the war today, with survivability sometimes being more important than sheer performance, the Gripen’s rugged architecture and electronic warfare superiority might be worth incremental improvements. But without a change in the underlying air defense calculus, even the most “purpose-built” aircraft might be grounded by the realities of a sky that neither side really owns.
