“The Russians could not have been unaware that they were striking civilians. And this is terror the world must not ignore,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wrote following a Russian “double tap” drone attack on Shostka railway station, which killed one and left at least 30 injured. The method striking a target, then again as rescuers make their way to the scene has become a signature of Moscow’s aggressive campaign against Ukraine’s railways and power grid, coordinated to arm the approaching winter.
Railway infrastructure, used for both military transport and civilian mobility, has been targeted nearly every day for two months. Ukrainian authorities indicate Russia is using Shahed-type long-range drones by the thousands up to 5,000 per month and, in at least some instances, arming them with cameras and cellular modems to monitor and attack moving targets like trains. These changes allow dynamic targeting deep beyond front lines, a possibility previously constrained by Russian air inferiority. The effect is pinpoint strikes against passenger trains, freight cars, and substations, frequently followed by power shortages impacting tens of thousands.
The same escalation is apparent in Russia’s missile campaign. Ukrainian and Western intelligence say Moscow has improved its Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aero ballistic missiles to escape US-produced Patriot air defence systems. These missiles now take a predictable course before suddenly changing direction or diving sharply, misleading Patriot interceptors. The Kinzhal, shot from MiG-31K aircraft, can accelerate up to Mach 10 in its terminal phase, and the Iskander-M comes in at high speed after a ballistic curve. Ukraine’s ballistic missile interception rate dropped from 37% in August to a mere 6% in September, even with a smaller number of launches, which emphasizes the success of the maneuvers.
Patriot systems are still the sole defense that Ukraine has against ballistic missiles. A battery consists of AN/MPQ-65 phased-array radar, a command-and-control station, and launchers which can fire PAC-2 or PAC-3 interceptors. The PAC-3 variant, which is meant for high-speed targets, uses hit-to-kill technology and accurate radar tracking. Russia’s changed flight patterns take advantage of the system’s engagement envelope, compelling Ukraine to use interceptors at poor angles or miss. With reduced US delivery speed of interceptors, the improved missiles pose a strategic threat.
Outside of Ukraine, Europe is facing an epidemic of suspicious drone sightings. In Germany, Munich Airport was shut down twice within 24 hours after police verified concurrent drone sightings close to both runways, affecting travel for more than 6,500 passengers. One police report, kept confidential, referred to the drones as “used militarily” and included sightings close to Frankfurt Airport, ammunition stores, and bases like Erding, where Bundeswehr conducts R&D of drones. The same has been witnessed over Danish and Belgian military installations and Copenhagen and Oslo airports, raising rumors of Russian hybrid warfare testing NATO’s airspace defenses.
European reactions are shifting. Germany’s Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt has announced intentions to deploy police with a specialized drone defense unit and urge legislation authorizing military shoot-downs. Detection equipment used at airports increasingly involves radio frequency (RF) scanning, electro-optical tracking, and radar that is sensitive to small, low-altitude targets. Neutralization techniques vary from RF jamming interfering with control links to directed-energy systems and kinetic interceptors. Counter-drone deployments in heavy-traffic areas must not cause collateral damage, so rapid identification is imperative.
The danger is exacerbated by Russia’s employment of electronic warfare. Moscow has increased GPS jamming and spoofing in the Baltic and Eastern Europe since 2022, targeting aircraft, vessels, and possibly drones. Analysts explain that sophisticated spoofing can provide false “good” signal quality to onboard systems and incorrect positional information, a strategy that could deceive navigation and make interception more difficult. This capacity has been associated with disruptions around airports and military areas, and is creating European navigation infrastructure resilience concerns.
The intersection of advanced missile systems, AI- or camera-capable drones, and electronic warfare represents a conscious Russian intention to stress defences, complicate civilian life, and push NATO’s preparedness. For Ukraine, its technological advantage in interception is diminishing; for Europe, its battlefront is extending into its airspace and vital infrastructure.
