Might Russia’s most sophisticated operating fighter also be its most conflict-weary? The recent delivery of Su-35S “Super Flanker” aircraft to Russia’s Armed Forces serves to highlight the plane’s significance as a strategic asset and Russia’s imperative to resupply losses taken in Ukraine’s disputed airspace. United Aircraft Corporation confirmed the transfer following ground and flight trials, at least the fifth reported this year a rate that continues Moscow’s increased production schedule to make up for attrition.
The Su-35S holds a distinctive place in the airpower strategy of Russia. Designed as a bridge to the fifth generation, it combines thrust-vectoring AL-41F1S engines, a strengthened composite-titanium airframe, and a 11,500 kg internal fuel capacity extension for range. Its aerodynamic improvements, such as canard deletion and quadruple-redundant fly-by-wire control, allow for post-stall maneuvers like the Cobra and Kulbit hallmarks of Russian supermaneuverability.
Central to its combat role is the N035 Irbis-E radar, a powerful X-band passive electronically scanned array capable of detecting a fighter-sized target at up to 400 km in narrow search sectors. However, as aviation expert Abhirup Sengupta warns, “The Irbis-E is marketed as having a 350 km range against 3 m² target while in reality that’s only in cued-search in a tiny FoV… in normal volume search that range shrinks down to 200 km.” The radar susceptibility to contemporary jamming combined with the OLS-35 infrared search and track system’s restricted non-imaging capability has attracted Western critics who perceive Su-35S as hyped relative to AESA-equipped contemporaries.
In Ukraine, the long-range interception strategy of the fighter has heavily relied on the R-37M missile, with the capability to engage targets at 124 miles, frequently shot from inside Russian territory. There is also recent evidence of operational deployment of the R-77M, heavily improved beyond-visual-range missile with a dual-pulse engine and improved seeker, possibly doubling the range of the R-77-1 up to about 100 miles. These standoff weapons have enabled Su-35S crews to threaten Ukrainian planes prior to their ability to counterattack, but they have not removed risk.
Confirmed losses number eight aircraft, with Ukrainian claims extending up to 25. Importantly, one Su-35S was shot down in June over the Kursk area by a Ukrainian F-16 piloted by an AIM-120 AMRAAM, the first air-to-air victory of the type. The engagement apparently depended upon targeting information supplied by a Swedish Saab 340 AEW&C platform, demonstrating how networked sensors and latest-generation missiles can offset the benefit of brute kinematic performance.
The attrition has been further compounded by Western-supplied Patriot system and other surface-based air defenses that have taken out Su-35S aircraft even deep within Russian borders. In February 2024 alone, the Russian side lost 60 air planes, including several Su-35s, which illustrates the difficulty of maintaining high-end fighter operations against an integrated air defense system layered with denial.
In spite of these delays, Rostec leaders remain stalwart supporters of the platform. “The Su-35S combines the power of modern weapons, advanced electronics, and unique maneuverability, which makes it a ‘universal soldier’ for carrying out the most difficult combat missions,” the company said. Deployments over Syria and Ukraine have proved elements of its design, from long-endurance high-altitude patrolling to multi-mission adaptability, and given live-firing testing to cutting-edge weapons such as the R-77M.
For Russia’s Aerospace Forces, the Su-35S is the workhorse of tactical aviation until the Su-57 stealth fighter comes of age. Its use as both frontline interceptor and diplomatic sales presentation for export buyers like China and Iran speaks to its dual nature: a war tool hammered into existence out of need and an emblem of Russian aerospace industry prowess. But as the experience in Ukraine shows, not even the zenith of fourth-generation fighter design can elude the changing realities of contemporary air-to-air combat, wherein sensor fusion, network targeting, and stealthiness increasingly determine survival.
