How can a small, specialized unit destroy valuable military equipment deep within enemy territory? Ukraine’s “Ghosts” have been giving a grim answer, using precision drone strikes and intelligence-directed targeting to destroy Russia’s operational capabilities in occupied Crimea.
In its most recent operation, Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate (HUR) reported the destruction of two Russian Antonov An‑26 transport planes and disabling key radar systems. The An‑26, known to NATO as “Curl,” is a twin‑engined turboprop designed in the Soviet Union, first entering service in 1970. Though production ceased in the 1980s, the aircraft remains in use for troop transport, cargo delivery, and logistical support. Its tough construction and capacity to operate from brief, unpaved runways give it utility for operations forward deployed, but also make it an inviting target taking out such assets has a direct impact on Russia’s capability to relocate troops and supplies through the peninsula.
The attack also destroyed a coastal MR‑10M1 “Mys M1” radar station and a surface surveillance radar facility. The MR‑10M1 is designed to provide maritime domain awareness, monitoring ships and low‑flying aircraft over coastlines. Their loss diminishes Russia’s capability to detect and track Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels and low-altitude drone penetrations. These radars frequently provide targeting information into integrated air defense networks, so their destruction can diminish the effectiveness of systems such as the S‑400 Triumf. The S‑400, Russia’s leading long-range surface‑to‑air missile system, is capable of engaging as many as 36 targets at once at ranges of 400 kilometers with a surveillance range of 600 kilometers. But Ukraine has been consistently exploiting weaknesses in these systems, having already knocked out several S‑400 batteries in the past, compelling the Russians to shift air defense assets elsewhere and possibly compromising coverage there.
The Ghosts’ tempo has also picked up. Just before the An‑26 attack, the battalion claimed the first‑ever combat loss of two Be‑12 “Chaika” amphibious planes rare Cold War‑era assets employed by Russia to pursue Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea. With just six Be‑12s at the beginning of 2023 and less than five airworthy, eliminating even two from operation could cut in half operational capability, highlighting the strategic significance of these attacks.
Ukraine’s drone warfare strategy extends beyond solitary tactical raids. Forces have used both long‑range loitering projectiles and short‑range FPV unmanned air vehicles to attack aircraft on the ground, radar facilities, and command infrastructure. The accuracy of such attacks is usually facilitated by extensive reconnaissance and pre‑strike intelligence, similar to the sophisticated coordination in multi‑axis drone flights elsewhere. Such actions are emblematic of a larger pattern in contemporary warfare: employing unmanned systems to go around conventional defenses and attack assets previously thought to be secure.
The implications reach beyond the Black Sea region. Western defense strategists have observed that these activities demonstrate weaknesses in airbases globally. As Vice President J.D. Vance cautioned, unmanned aerial systems “pose a serious challenge to national security” and require immediate investment in counter-UAS technology. The United States military’s Joint Counter‑small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office has experimented with kinetic interceptors, electronic warfare technology, and “flyaway kit” mobiles to protect exposed facilities. Experience in Ukraine indicates that layered defenses detect, electronic disrupt, and hard‑kill interceptors are necessary, especially against low‑cost drones with precision strike capability.
The Russian campaign in Crimea also demonstrates the interaction between attrition and maneuver. Through methodically undermining radar coverage and killing transport and patrol aircraft, the Ghosts are undermining Russia’s situational awareness and mobility, creating conditions for further operational impact. Military historians have compared this to the opening phase of maneuver warfare when blocking the enemy’s command, control, and logistics creates exploitable gaps. Within the contested “air littoral” the low‑altitude battlespace of drones control may also serve as a new flank, allowing strikes to skirt around well-protected ground positions.
For Russia, every loss adds to the difficulty of protecting Crimea’s airspace and shoreline. For Ukraine, every victory buttresses a template for warfare in which low-cost drones, directed by top-level special operations intelligence, can deliver strategic impact once the domain of high-end missile attacks. And for defense strategists around the world, the Ghosts’ operations are a textbook on how technology, doctrine, and precision targeting are transforming the math of contemporary air and coast defense.
