Within two months, Ukraine’s DeepStrike campaign has hit 85 valuable targets deep within Russian territory, a rate and accuracy which have pushed Moscow’s military logistics into crisis. The 33 strikes targeting military facilities like bases, warehouses, and airfields and the 52 targeting military-industrial facilities where weapons, ammunition, fuel, and drones are being manufactured have been attributed by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi to “significantly” cutting the capabilities of Russia’s military-industrial complex. “This is a fuel crisis in Russia, which directly affects logistics and the supply of its army,” Syrskyi said.
The campaign’s most strategically destabilizing blows have been against Russia’s fuel terminals and oil refineries. These are extremely vulnerable to air attack because their central operations catalytic crackers, distillation towers, and storage tanks process units, leading to cascading shutdowns. Three times since August, Ukrainian drones have attacked Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, which refines 6.25 million tons of oil annually and provides diesel and aviation kerosene to Russian troops, making them conduct partial shutdowns and setting off fires. Krasnodar Krai’s proximity to occupied Crimea makes it a critical logistics hub; its disruption has contributed to 50% of gas stations in Crimea and Sevastopol halting gasoline sales.
Ukrainian attacks have damaged 16 of Russia’s 38 oil refineries since August 2025, reducing refining capacity by more than 1 million barrels per day and lowering diesel exports to their lowest level since 2020, Energy Aspects reports. The attacks diminish not only Russia’s supply of fuel for military use but also chip away at its export earnings, a major source of funding for the war. The Kremlin has reacted with export prohibitions on gasoline and diesel for non-producers, a move that highlights the severity of the supply shock.
From an operational and engineering standpoint, DeepStrike exploits a varied drone inventory. First-person view (FPV) drones conduct precision attacks against armored assets and infrastructure, while long-range unmanned air vehicles push hundreds of kilometers to strike refineries and airfields. Ukraine’s UAV operators combine real-time reconnaissance with strike missions, frequently employing swarms to saturate air defense. The tactic is similar to the practice of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) war, but waged offensively denying Russia secure logistical corridors by attacking fuel nodes and transport hubs.
The impact on Russian logistics is compounded by structural weaknesses. As explained in defense logistics reports, Russia’s downsized but modernized Material Technical Support brigades depend very much on pipelines and rail distribution, with only minimal truck capacity for “last mile” delivery. If refineries and fuel depots are taken out of commission, the supply chain is deprived of both source capacity as well as distribution flexibility. Extending supply lines more than 150 kilometers from distribution centers can cut transport capacity by over 50%, causing logistics culmination where operational tempo disintegrates due to insufficiency of supply.
Ukraine’s drone manufacturing has the technological capability to produce as much as 8 million drones annually, President Volodymyr Zelensky said, but funding is a bottleneck. Production goals today, even with Western assistance, do not reach the 10 million per year that analysts estimate could clinch the balance of battlefield power by allowing for sustained drone swarms to saturate Russian defenses. To reach that capacity would take an extra €10 billion over two years, plus stable supply chains for key components.
Here is another strategic limitation: up to 65% of Ukrainian drone components come from China, including navigation cameras, flight controllers, and motors. This reliance is a double-edged sword China has restricted exports to Ukraine while still providing similar components to Russia, which are commonly discovered in crashed Shahed drones. The irony is that Western investment in Ukrainian drones can indirectly support Chinese supply chains that also serve Moscow.
Engineering resilience in Ukraine’s drone manufacturing will involve diversification of component sources, increased domestic production, and integration with allied industrial bases. Examples like Denmark’s pooled procurement procuring directly from the Ukrainian manufacturers with donor funds provide cost-efficient scaling, but need to be accompanied by strategic investment in non-Chinese supply lines so as not to reinforce adversary capabilities.
DeepStrike’s success in operations highlights a central reality of contemporary warfare: sophisticated drone strikes can tear apart intricate logistics networks quicker than they can be reconstituted. Through the synergy of technical advancement, flexible manufacturing, and precision attacks against fuel infrastructure, Ukraine has put Russia on the defensive in its own depth. The campaign’s continuation, though, will depend on whether Ukraine can bridge both its funding shortfall and component reliance to sustain and grow this new style of strategic warfare.
