A stealth aircraft packed with dozens of long-range air-to-air missiles is no longer a hypothetical idea it is being actively researched by the U.S. Air Force as part of planning for a possible high-intensity war against China in the Indo-Pacific region. Senior officials have agreed that “there are other ways of achieving ‘affordable mass’ than darkening the skies with CCAs,” as stated by the Collaborative Combat Aircraft drones already on the drawing board. The arsenal aircraft, as a flying-wing platform, would be out of range, filling or even substituting some CCA functions by offering deep “magazine depth” for fighters such as the F-22, F-35, and follow-on F-47.
A candidate for conversion is the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, which is currently undergoing flight testing. Although a fully specification B-21 is an costly and highly advanced asset, an optionally manned, sensor-degraded, communications-degraded, slightly stealth-degraded variant could utilize the bomber’s airframe at less cost. This would obviate concerns regarding Northrop Grumman’s production capacity, which is forecast to hit 10 Raiders annually in the early 2030s. A dedicated air-to-air model would prevent diverting baseline B-21s from their main strike mission, something Air Force Global Strike Command will not soon welcome.
The operating concept depends on coupling the arsenal plane with air-to-air fighters that find and identify targets and then allow for missile launches at beyond-the-threat envelope ranges. This configuration directly addresses one of the long-standing complaints of F-22 and F-35 flight crews regarding limited missile carriage. A Raider-class plane would have the ability to transport large quantities of AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missiles providing longer range than the AIM-120 AMRAAM but having the same dimensions and even oversized munitions such as the AIM-174, the air-launched variant of the SM-6, with a longer range than any earlier U.S. air-to-air missile.
From an engineering perspective, the flying-wing design has a low radar cross-section and large internal volume for missile bays, but there are issues regarding structural integration and thermal load when carrying heavy munitions. Such lessons as the B-21 program and secret flying-wing projects could be applied to solutions. The design is analogous to naval “arsenal ships,” which increase missile capacity for surface ships, and might be adapted to unmanned operation to mitigate risk and expense.
The other option employing more survivable and payload-capable uncrewed combat air vehicles (UCAVs) in place of CCAs is still missing from Air Force plans, even though China’s evolving capabilities in this area are certainly visible. Satellite photos of Malan test base in Xinjiang have shown to exist a big, low-observable flying-wing type drone with a ‘cranked kite’ planform, possibly an upgrade of the CH-7, perhaps to be used in air-to-air support missions. China’s 46-foot wingspan, 930-mile combat radius, autonomous mission-capable GJ-11 “Sharp Sword” UCAV highlights the PLA’s focus on stealth drone strike and support platforms.
Strategically, Indo-Pacific theater-wide distances and contested electromagnetic space suit platforms with high internal fuel and weapon load. As described in long-range kill-chain planning, leveraging distributed assets such as CCAs is risky if datalinks are disrupted by electronic warfare. One large, self-sustaining arsenal aircraft might remain combat effective even when disconnected from other force elements a key consideration for operations against China’s integrated air defenses and long-range missile forces.
The Asian missile proliferation environment injects a sense of urgency. China’s PLA Rocket Force has a varied inventory of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range systems, including dual-capable DF-26s with rapidly exchangeable payloads, DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicles, and anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D. These systems are intended to threaten U.S. enablers like aerial refueling tankers, requiring American fighters to operate at longer ranges. An AIM-260 or AIM-174-equipped arsenal plane could recapture reach and killing power without depending on sacrificial forward tanker operations.
Timing is of the essence as well. The F-47, which is meant to be the tip of the spear for future air superiority, will not take to the skies until 2028, and its estimated cost three times an F-35 could restrict procurement. Despite intended purchases of 185 aircraft, plus F-35s and CCAs, Air Force planners remain skeptical this combination alone can achieve air supremacy over the Pacific during an extended campaign. A stealth flying-wing missile carrier would address that shortcoming, providing focused firepower from outside the threat envelope, and drawing on the engineering legacy of the B-21 to fulfill the operational requirements of the next missile age in the Indo-Pacific.
