Then, in July 2016, the USS Freedom, one of the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships (LCS), sailed off to participate in the world’s largest naval exercise, RIMPAC. The LCS class was promised as a naval technological breakthrough, small but powerful warships which would be deployed in near-shore waters (the littoral zone), fast and nimble enough to defend against submarines, mines, and surface attack. But beneath the gloss of this promise was a troubling fact: a history of operational setbacks, design flaws, and staggering cost overruns.
The Freedom’s RIMPAC deployment was a risky endeavor, intended to demonstrate the capabilities of the ship in the face of mounting skepticism. But even this deployment was troubled, including a disabled engine due to “galloping corrosion,” a symptom of a far larger issue with the LCS program that had seen billions of taxpayers’ dollars spent on a fleet that struggled to accomplish its missions.
The ailments of the LCS program run deep, all the way back to its conception. Initially pitched by then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vernon Clark in 2002, the LCS would be fast and agile, with interchangeable mission packs for various perils. But Navy experts warned against the size of the program and the technological barriers. Disregarding these warnings, the Navy proceeded, driven by the prospect of a new class of warship to be built cheaply and quickly.
The first LCS ships to be deployed were beset by problems. The ships, costing more than $500 million each—more than double the initial estimated cost—were prone to mechanical breakdown. The Freedom class, in particular, suffered with a combining gear linking the diesel and gas engines to the propulsion system and caused a number of at-sea malfunctions. Making speed a priority over fuel efficiency restricted the vessels’ operating range. Even their primary missions, such as mine-hunting and anti-submarine warfare, were hindered by inadequate technology and malfunctioning systems that did not work together.
Despite the failures, the LCS program had a committed set of defenders in the Navy and Congress. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, serving between 2009 and 2017, was a LCS defender who persisted in desiring a large and diverse fleet. Political math was apparent, ships ordered in shipyards across states, creating jobs and political support. The strategy, however, involved the Navy being committed to two different LCS designs, the Independence class and Freedom class, neither of which were substitutable nor economically efficient in the long term.
Efforts by Defense Secretaries Chuck Hagel and Ash Carter to limit the program were foiled and were met with partial success. Despite increasing evidence of the LCS’s flaws, political pressure and the influence of defense contractors ensured the program’s continuation.
The final product was a fleet that cost taxpayers dearly, both in dollars and in the opportunity cost of other, perhaps more valuable naval spending. The lifetime cost of the LCS fleet could be $100 b or more, says John Pendleton, a retired senior analyst at the Government Accountability Office.
