Could one of the most deadly precision munitions in the American arsenal actually bomb a target the Pentagon still can’t define? That was the question looming after a House subcommittee hearing this week, when Rep. Eric Burlison of Missouri presented a 50-second video supposedly taken on October 30, 2024, off the coast of Yemen. The footage, released as whistleblower-supplied, depicts an MQ‑9 Reaper drone following a small airborne object variously labeled as an “orb” or cylindrical shape as another Reaper launches an AGM‑114 Hellfire missile. The weapon seems to hit, spilling debris, but the object persists undeterred.
To weapons designers, the image is baffling. The AGM‑114 Hellfire is a laser‑guided air‑to‑ground missile that weighs around 100 pounds and has a high‑explosive anti‑tank (HEAT) or blast‑fragmentation warhead to annihilate armored targets, fortifications, or high‑speed boats. In this instance, the target display indicated “LRD LASE DES,” which means that it was a buddy‑lasing engagement whereby one Reaper lased the target for the other’s missile. As reported by journalist George Knapp, “That’s a Hellfire missile smacking into that UFO and [it] just bounced right off, and it kept going.”
The apparent failure of the missile to detonate presents technical possibilities. A grazing impact may have inhibited the fuze from firing, particularly if the missile did not have an optimization for aerial intercept proximity fuze. Laser-guided Hellfires are intended for precision attacks on ground targets, not necessarily for striking small, maneuvering airborne objects with low radar or infrared signature. The U.S. military has tried to modify Hellfires for anti‑air missions, but success is greatly dependent on fuze sensitivity, attack angle, and the properties of target materials.
Physics provides another perspective: even if the warhead worked, a tiny, low-density target may not create the Hollywood-style fireball expected. Momentum may propel debris or intact pieces forward after impact, depending on the structure of the object absorbing or deflecting the blast. Witnesses to the hearing mentioned the object’s uniform course before and after the impact, though quality of video leaves to conjecture whether this was active control or mere ballistic continuation.
The deployment also showcases the MQ‑9 Reaper’s expanding mission set. Initially deployed for ISR and precision strike missions against ground targets, the Reaper has been demonstrated in air‑to‑air operations such as a 2017 shootdown of a target drone using an AIM‑9X Sidewinder. In the Red Sea theater, where Houthi forces have sent hundreds of drones and cruise missiles against shipping, Reapers have been tasked with counter‑UAV responsibilities. Employing a Hellfire in this capacity could have been an ad hoc decision against perceived jeopardy to U.S. or allied assets.
The operational environment is important. Since late 2023, Houthi rebels armed with Iranian technology and training have shot down several MQ‑9s and attacked commercial shipping. U.S. military responses have included layered defenses, ranging from ship‑launched Standard Missiles to laser‑guided 70 mm APKWS rockets launched by fighters. The Yemen object might have theoretically been an enemy drone, a balloon-launched sensor, or something more far‑outed. As Rep. Anna Paulina Luna queried witnesses, “Are you aware of anything in the U.S. arsenal that can split a Hellfire missile like this… and then keep going?” The answer from military veterans Dylan Borland, Jeffrey Nuccetelli, and Alexandro Wiggins was an unambiguous “no.”
From a materials standpoint, withstanding a Hellfire impact would demand exceptional toughness high‑end composites, energy‑absorbing materials, or active countermeasures. No known U.S. or allied system has such performance publicly recognized. Assuming the object was a UAP, categorized under the Pentagon’s All‑domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) guidelines, it is one of a limited number of cases resistant to explanation by conventional means.
AARO reports say that the majority of sightings are ultimately attributed to balloons, drones, or planes, but a “very small percentage” are left anomalous and worthy of further scientific investigation. The Yemen incident also points to a gap in transparency. Burlison said he has requested the Department of Defense explain and has received no response. Knapp intimated “there are servers where there’s a whole bank of these kind of videos that Congress has not been allowed to see.” To defense technologists, the questions left unanswered are as much regarding rules of engagement why shoot at a unidentified object in the absence of complete context as regarding the nature of the object. For the time being, the video remains a unique, open look at an encounter in which advanced American arms clashed with something they were powerless to take down.
