What becomes of innocuous scientific materials when they fall under the scope of global biosecurity law?
28-year-old Wuhan’s Huazhong University of Science and Technology graduate student Chengxuan Han appeared in a Detroit federal courthouse in front of U.S. District Judge Matthew Leitman and found that her three-month jail sentence was sufficient. Han had entered a plea of no contest to smuggling and lying charges of sending research materials plasmids and Caenorhabditis elegans to Michigan contacts without labeling or approval. Both are staples of basic biological research: plasmids are circular, small fragments of DNA found naturally in bacteria, and C. elegans is a small nematode commonly employed in genetics and neurobiology. Neither is infectious to humans.
The offense was not in the materials themselves being harmful, but in the manner in which they had been mailed. Han concealed filter paper with 28 samples of plasmids packaged as a book, and sent petri dishes with the worms in ordinary boxes. The shipments bypassed U.S. Department of Agriculture and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention importation processes, which allow for permits even to non-pathogens if foreign in origin. These permits have the effect of making materials examined, reviewed for containment plans, and documented in transit measures aimed at avoiding the accidental introduction of invasive species or contaminants.
Judge Leitman acknowledged the necessity of vigilance. “Government agents have a critical role in stopping ‘bad actors’ from trying to get ‘bad stuff’ into the country,” he said, but emphasized that “from what I can tell, this material was not a threat at all.” Han, speaking through a translator, told the court, “I really have no intention to harm anybody and create a security hazard,” describing the ordeal as a “very painful” lesson that would end her career.
The case of Han is only one part of a wider increasing grip on foreign scientists, notably Chinese ones, in the US, as concern over biosecurity has been intensified in the COVID-19 pandemic’s wake. Even harmless biological material is covered by intricate international shipping regulations under legislation like the International Air Transport Association’s Dangerous Goods Regulations and World Health Organization guidelines for the transport of infectious agents. Although plasmids and C. elegans, are in exempt categories, misbranding or concealment can bring about enforcement action under U.S. customs law.
Her case ran concurrently with a more egregious case against two other Chinese scientists at the University of Michigan, Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu, who were charged with smuggling Fusarium graminearum, a fungus disease pathogen sometimes referred to by prosecutors as a purported agroterrorism agent. It infects rice, barley, maize, and wheat to cause Fusarium head blight, which produces mycotoxins like deoxynivalenol more commonly referred to as vomitoxin that can cause vomiting, damage to the liver, and reproductive diseases in humans and animals. While the disease pathogen is already present in the U.S. and has been studied for over a century, experts note that imported forms might carry with them resistances such as fungicide resistance or altered toxin production. The U.S. Department of Agriculture issues a permit on any importation of F. graminearum, with more screening for foreign isolates, such as laboratory inspections and formal containment protocols.
Plant pathologist Gary Bergstrom described the risk of introducing a new strain as would be if some new trait was introduced with a new strain that got out into the system, potentially making it less sensitive to existing fungicides. Caitlyn Allen, professor emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, stressed that one of the most useful ways of solving disease problems on our crops is to breed crops that are resistant to the disease, avoiding chemical control dependency. Breeding programs are guided by learning from various pathogen strains but only under containment.
Conversely, Han’s exported species are found throughout laboratories across the globe and do not have the same form of farm or public health risk. Nevertheless, the law code is non-discriminatory with regard to intent; smuggling and incorrect documentation are criminal offenses under laws regardless of the degree of risk in the material. This conveys a fundamental principle of enforcement of biosecurity: movement of materials with chain of custody and openness is as important as the biological character of the material.
The Han case highlights the conflict between the global character of contemporary science and national regimes that control it. For scientists generally and scientists involved in multi-national cooperation projects in particular, the message is clear even apparently innocuous biological tools must go the correct legal route, or else they will become part of a courthouse soap opera.
