Could the U.S. Air Force have fielded the world’s first supersonic stealth bomber two decades earlier than planned? In the early 2000s, Lockheed Martin’s FB-22 “Strike Raptor” proposal promised exactly that a radical transformation of the F-22 Raptor air superiority fighter into a medium-range, deep-strike platform with unprecedented speed, stealth, and payload for its class.
The FB-22 concept was born from a convergence of operational need and engineering opportunity. The B-2 Spirit fleet was small, costly, and still maturing, while the F-117 Nighthawk was being retired. Air Force Secretary James Roche envisioned a fleet of 150 FB-22s as an “interim” stealth bomber, bridging the gap until a next-generation strategic bomber arrived decades later. By taking advantage of up to 80 percent commonality with the F-22’s avionics, sensors, and subsystems, Lockheed Martin estimated development costs at a fraction of a clean-sheet bomber $5–$7 billion.
The redesign demanded extensive aerodynamic and structural alterations. Fuselage length stayed at 64.33 feet to keep costs in check, but wings were redesigned to an extended delta planform with triple the surface area of the F-22’s, increasing internal fuel capacity by 80 percent and increasing combat radius from 600 to about 1,800–2,000 miles. This was a step for a fighter-based airframe, but not yet intercontinental bomber range. The delta wings also provided carriage of as many as 35 GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs internally, or as much as 30,000 pounds of ordnance in a non-stealth layout on 27 hardpoints.
Stealth was the heart of the FB-22’s mission. Engineers intended to incorporate improved radar-absorbent coatings over the original Raptor’s, and to utilize faceted external pods to maintain low observability while carrying weapons externally. The design preserved broadband, all-aspect stealth concepts essential for breaking through contemporary integrated air defense systems (IADS) that utilize both low-frequency search radars and high-frequency fire-control radars. Having a second crew member, a Weapons Systems Officer, would have enhanced target management and strike coordination on long-range missions.
Propulsion overhauls were similarly grandiose. The FB-22 would replace the F-22’s Pratt & Whitney F119 engines with more powerful F135 turbofans from the F-35, allowing for a Mach 1.8–1.9 top speed despite increased mass. Thrust-vectoring nozzles would be eliminated, sacrificing extreme maneuverability in favor of efficiency and payload. Maneuver limits would fall to 6g within limits for a bomber not designed for close-in combat.
From an engineering perspective, adding payload without compromising stealth and range was a significant challenge. Higher wing area and internal bays translated into more drag and weight, necessitating thorough aerodynamic optimization to maintain supersonic dash capability. Stealth shaping needed to be revalidated for the new planform, especially around wing-body junctions and possible elimination of vertical stabilizers. Thermal management for greater fuel loads and extended supersonic flight also necessitated redesign of cooling systems and materials.
Strategically, the FB-22 would have delivered a capability similar to the now-retired F-111 Aardvark high-speed regional strike but with fifth-generation survivability. It might have substituted for the F-15E Strike Eagle in deep interdiction missions, filling out B-1Bs and B-52s with an aircraft capable of penetrating deeply defended airspace in the first day of war. Its planned capability to deliver 5,000-pound-class weapons internally would have provided it with a niche as an air defense suppression aircraft and against hardened targets.
But the timing of the program was fatal. By the mid-2000s, U.S. combat efforts were targeting counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, where stealth penetration bombers were not needed. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review canceled the FB-22 in favor of developing what became the B-21 Raider, a long-range strategic bomber with worldwide reach. Issues also remained regarding the FB-22’s diminished maneuverability, maintenance-intensive stealth coatings carried over from the F-22, and susceptibility of Pacific island bases to ballistic missile attack constraints for a platform with regional instead of intercontinental range.
The move was part of a larger shift in acquisition philosophy. The Air Force wanted to prevent the B-2 debacle, whose costs ballooned, and to make use of lessons from the troubled production of the F-35. The B-21’s streamlined management by the Rapid Capabilities Office, the use of mature technologies, and the open-systems architecture were partly a response to previous programs such as the FB-22 that promised revolutionary capability but threatened to overlap with new systems.
Today, the FB-22 is an “a what if” of aerospace history a design that on paper married the stealth of a fifth-generation fighter with the bomb-carrying capacity of a bomber, possibly changing the calculus of air power in the Western Pacific and beyond. Its engineering solutions to range, payload, and survivability problems continue to underpin debate over how to modify existing airframes for new missions even as the Air Force develops purpose-built platforms like the B-21.
