“This is the first-ever strike on a Be-12 in history,” announced Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) following the destruction of two Beriev Be-12 Chayka amphibian planes and a Mi-8 helicopter at Kacha Air Base outside Sevastopol by suicide drones. The Sept. 21 operation, conducted by the GUR’s “Ghost” special forces unit, is a rare and technically noteworthy strike against one of Russia’s least extensive aerial resources.
The Be-12, otherwise NATO-designated “Mail,” made its maiden flight in 1960 and was intended for anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol missions. It was constructed by Beriev, and its twin turboprop engines and boat-shaped fuselage enable both land- and sea-based operations. Although obsolescent for its intended task, the plane has value remaining in reconnaissance and search-and-rescue functions, especially for observing Ukraine’s increasing number of uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) in the Black Sea. Its glassed nose station provides broad visibility for detection of small sea threats to navigators, supplemented by onboard radar offering rudimentary coastal watch. As of early 2023, Russia operated only six Be-12s, four or five of which were flyable, the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported. If both aircraft engaged at Kacha were flyable, the raid could have halved Russia’s available fleet.
The drones employed in the attack were man-in-the-loop “kamikaze” drones that can precision-target even in defended airspace. The same platforms have struck Russian helicopters at rear-area airfields, taking advantage of weaknesses during low-speed ground attacks. FPV drones, with airborne relay systems, can strike a dozen miles into the rear without line-of-sight, a feature enhanced by developing AI-enabled navigation. In these instances, the unmanned aerial systems were flown in at high speed, as one can witness in Ukrainian-released video, before they detonated upon impact with the stand-down aircraft.
For Moscow, the loss is more than the demise of old airframes. The Be-12s have enabled the Black Sea Fleet’s anti-access/area denial (A2AD) stance by patrolling for USVs that have rammed warships, attacked the Kerch Bridge, and bombarded radar installations. Alexander Lord of Sibylline pointed out that “while they are old aircraft, their anti-submarine capabilities are likely useful in identifying Ukrainian drone threats.” The UK Ministry of Defence has termed them as a “key Russia asset” conducting maritime patrols from occupied Crimea.
The attack also highlights Ukraine’s developing drone warfare strategy. From initial kamikaze USVs to reusable launchers firing bomber drones, Kyiv has grown manned-unmanned teaming operations to weaken Russian radar, surveillance, and air defense networks. Blitzes on hardened aircraft shelters at Belbek Air Base and radar sites such as the Nebo-M have been part of an ongoing effort to strip Russia of situational awareness over the skies and waters surrounding Crimea.
Technically, the Be-12 is not very survivable in contested airspace. Unfitted with contemporary electronic warfare suites or infrared countermeasures, it relies on flying in uncontested areas conditions Ukraine’s drones are increasingly undermining. On the ground, the aircraft are vulnerable to standoff attacks, a weakness compounded by Russia’s failure to effectively shield rear-area bases from low-cost, precision-guided drones.
The Mi-8 helicopter lost in the same raid exemplifies another facet of Ukraine’s targeting campaign. Rotary-wing resources have taken a beating in the war thanks to layered air defense systems and drone threats. As former U.S. AH-6 pilot Greg Coker has noted, survivability under such conditions demands “low and fast” flight profiles and sophisticated countermeasures abilities that Russian helicopters frequently do not have. This year, Ukrainian drones have managed to intercept Mi-8s during takeoff, taking advantage of the low, slow phase of flight.
Strategically, the Kacha strike has both material and psychological impacts. Materially, it takes rare maritime patrol aircraft out of Russia’s order of battle. Psychologically, it tells domestic and foreign publics that Ukraine is capable of going deep into one of Russia’s most heavily defended areas, defying Moscow’s description of Crimea as a secure “Russian lake.” As King’s College London Dr. Marina Miron explains, “Both Ukraine and Russia are competing not only on the battlefield but also in the information space,” and high-visibility attacks on scarce assets heighten that competition.
With its dwindling reserves and no new replacement program development work on the Be-200 amphibious patrol aircraft has slowed the Russian Navy could be forced to retire the Be-12 ahead of schedule. Whether this attack signifies the end of the Chayka’s venerable career or not, it illustrates how precision drone warfare is redefining the calculus of operations in the Black Sea region.
