The next fighter decision in Canada is more about the mission data and long-term sustainment control, rather than which jet would be better on a spec sheet. The announcement of the 88 F-35s fielding plan revived a long standing point with a new stinging aspect: to what extent would operational autonomy be maintained when the software, updates and support ecosystem of the aircraft are closely controlled offshore.
Ottawa has already pre-committed 16 F-35s, and is considering the option to go with the rest or to look at other alternatives like the Gripen E/F of Saab. The strategic environment remains the same: the replacement of the CF-18 is the largest modernisation process in the Royal Canadian Air Force in decades that is predetermined by the distances of the Arctic, small Northern infrastructure, and binational demands within the framework of NORAD.
The F-35 has never lacked appeal as a platform because of the deep networking it provides: stealth, sensor fusion and the capability to interface with U.S. and NATO tactics, data standards and command-and-control processes. That is relevant in a NORAD context, where the focus of the mission is less on self-sustaining expeditionary airpower and more on the need to be integrated with an overall air-defense architecture. However, the same integration comes at a cost: the F-35 business is developed based on pipelines of centralized software updates and mission information. The outcome is a plane that can be far more proficient and still remain one that relies on external decision cycles to be able to make critical decisions on digital sustainability.
The Gripen landing falls into the gap. Its proponents emphasize a fighter that was tailored to dispersed combat and high-readiness, and a national-control strategy of sustainment and improvements. The aircraft has become a debate in Canada as it is perceived as being “good enough” to provide sovereignty patrols and intercept operations, particularly in harsh-weather missions where sortie generation and turnaround time has become as significant as peak capability. Reality Readiness and sustainment continues to intrude into the discussion.
The U.S. program, reported by watchdogs, has also pointed to the increased cost estimate of sustainment (44 percent) between 2018 and 2023 as well as less planned flying and availability not matching the targets across variants. The trends do not necessarily translate into Canadian operations, but they influence how the smaller fleets feel the risk: a warfighting advantage in a fighter aircraft will be less important when components, technicians and repair space are now the strophants of daily alert and training.
The industrial as well as infrastructure preparations within Canada can testify to the extent to which the program is larger than the airplane. Governmental documents have explained how every F-35 manufactured is composed of some 3.6 million Canadian-made parts, linking the domestic industry to an international supply chain. Parallel to this, the National Defence has been proceeding with the modernization of bases, such as Cold Lake and Bagotville, and the purchase of equipment that stretches to the forward operating bases in the North–operational preparations that will either make or break any future fleet able to produce sorties where it counts.
The argument of sovereignty on a non-U.S. fighter is not clean though. Even proponents of Gripen have to confront the fact that key sub systems are external to Sweden; the engine and the avionics are among the key components that are US based suppliers. Differently stated, “autonomy” may also denote a variety of issues, such as access to software, the right to upgrade, possession of a depot, or even mere political diversification, and not all these may be assured by changing airframes.
At the center sits NORAD. U.S. warning of the need to modify the continental air defense in case Canada reduces its purchase refines the immediate interests, but the long-term issue is more technical than rhetorical: which plane is most appropriate to generate sorties in the Arctic and maintain its control over the relationship between the pace of sustainment and modernization options in Canada and control of its own data, as direct as possible.
