The hallmark of China’s J-35 program has not been a particular flight test or a new coat of paint. It has been the production posture that underlies the aircrafta strategy that focuses on capacity expansion, automation, and a carrier air wing that is sized for operational, not symbolic, purposes.
Open-source reporting indicates that Shenyang Aircraft Corporation is set to double the production of J-35s in the five-year window, with mass production set to begin in 2026. This is based on an 8.6 billion yuan investment in a new production facility measuring 4.2 square kilometers, as well as the establishment of an “intelligent manufacturing” system that aims to integrate tooling, assembly, and quality processes throughout the entire production chain.
One of the visual details that has become a subtle indicator of program tempo is the presence of imagery of J-35 aircraft in green factory primer, a scheme that seems to be present on aircraft that have been photographed as they have moved through the early stages of production. The significance of the color is not the pointthe fact that these observations are being repeated is. The new facility has been characterized as part of a larger “Shenyang Aerospace City” plan, with a scope of planning measured in dozens of square kilometers.
Scale is important because the J-35 is marketed as a operational platform for joint operations, rather than a niche fleet. Chinese sources characterize it as a medium-sized multirole stealth fighter designed for air superiority and strike roles, which complements the air-dominance role of the heavier J-20. An analysis by the Royal United Services Institute has characterized the J-35A as being in low-rate initial production as of late 2025, while also observing: “In 2025, PLAAF and PLAN AF aircrew routinely fly complex training and demonstration of force sorties involving fighters, bombers, tankers and AEW&C aircraft, in coordination with each other and with PLAN surface action groups.”
The training environment is important because it implies that the aircraft’s strengths are expected to accrue within larger setstankers, airborne early warning, surface combatants, and electronic attacks rather than in isolated peer-versus-peer engagements. The other force multiplier is carrier integration. China’s Type 003 carrier, Fujian, is linked with a CATOBAR flight deck and electromagnetic catapults, which will allow for heavier launch weights and more flexible sortie generation than ski-jump flight decks.
Open-source reports have identified Fujian as displacing 80,000-85,000 tons and featuring three catapults, which will be used to support a balanced air wing that includes the J-35 and fixed-wing airborne early warning platforms such as the KJ-600. The emergence of J-35 handling and launch events linked to Fujian’s catapult testing has only served to further underscore the larger trend that China’s naval aviation is integrating aircraft design, flight deck operations, and ship power systems into a unified system rather than pursuing them as distinct force modernization efforts.
The end result is a program that calls attention less to technological intrigue and more to infrastructure. A former intelligence officer from a NATO nation encapsulated the underlying message in the primary reporting: “As with most of the PRC-developed weapon systems, the surge of J-35 production is likely to move forward at a speed that most US or European modern military aircraft production enterprises would find difficult if not impossible to keep pace with.” Within this context, the strategic significance of the J-35 is the factory and the flight deck combined a plane intended to be mass-produced and integrated into ever more complex training scenarios.
