“We did not anticipate the widespread use of such drones when the war began,” a Russian Helicopters representative conceded at the Army-2024 forum. That admission highlights the need for Russia’s new electronic warfare innovation: the “Multik” system, a miniature counter-UAV package that is meant to protect helicopters and other vehicles from first-person-view (FPV) drones that have become the signature of Ukrainian battlefield operations.
Designed by VNII “Gradient,” Multik is designed to sense and jam the video transmission streams that FPV drones rely on for control. By creating purpose-designed interference in a wide operational range from 700 MHz to 6,000 MHz the system intends to cut off the pilot’s line-of-sight, rendering both the drone blind and harmless, before it reaches its destination. Three independent jamming channels are incorporated into its architecture, allowing for the simultaneous targeting of several threats. The detection range can be up to 1,000 meters, with practical jamming ability at about 500 meters, assuming a 2-watt transmitter characteristic of low-cost FPV systems.
The Multik is intentionally small in form factor, weighing less than 9.5 kilograms and consuming up to 350 watts from a 27V onboard power supply. This makes mounting on aircraft like the Mi-8/17 possible without exacting high aerodynamic penalties. External mounting most probably on pylons is unobstructed 360-degree azimuth, which is essential for rotary-wing aircraft that can attack from any azimuth in low-altitude operations. Optional remote command with a minimum distance of 30 meters offers additional flexibility for ground or static use.
The system’s appearance is a greater trend in the Russo-Ukrainian war: electronic warfare increasingly adapted to defeat cheap, mass-produced threats. Ukrainian FPV drones, which are frequently built from commercial parts for less than $500, have been responsible for out-of-proportion destruction of Russian equipment, including the sinking of valuable platforms like the $16 million Ka-52 attack helicopter. Being dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for navigation and control, they are vulnerable to jamming, but the problem is to provide interference in a timely and precise manner so that it can disable a quickly maneuvering target.
Russia’s strategy with Multik is replicated in other counter-drone technologies observed on the battlefield. Ad-hoc vehicle-borne jammers, such as the adapted T-72B3M “Tsar” tank with phased array antennas, have proven to counter multiple drones of different frequencies, albeit with garish installations. The capture by Ukrainian forces of similar systems has yielded information into Russian EW capabilities, revealing the secrecy and complexity of this area.
Layered defense ideas also begin to emerge. Physical “cope cages” and mesh screens have been fitted to helicopters, with a view to triggering early detonation of drone warheads. Directed-energy tests indicate Russia is looking at non-kinetic hard-kill solutions, and the “Light Afganit” idea envisages modular radar and EW packs for older vehicles. Multik falls into this category as a soft-kill, mobile solution aimed at airborne platforms, and is designed to augment kinetic interceptors and physical protection.
The tactical rationale for airborne EW is apparent. FPV drones take advantage of radar gaps and can be flown down uncertain paths to avoid ground defenses. Helicopters, frequently assigned close air support or troop lift duties, are within the effective range of the drones and slower to turn away from danger. By incorporating Multik, Russia hopes to provide these aircraft with an active, on-the-move defense against spectrum-based attacks.
Though the marketing efforts highlight deployment readiness, not much is known about Multik’s performance on the battlefield. No credible reports validate its application in ongoing conflicts, and no production size or cost is revealed. However, the system’s specifications indicate it is designed for the conditions of this war where the EMS is as contested as the landscape, and where survival becomes ever more dependent upon the capacity to occlude the enemy’s vision before the gun finds its target.
