Australia’s latest airpower decision matters because it changes the balance between platforms and firepower. Rather than expanding its F-35 fleet toward 100 aircraft, Canberra has settled on 72 operational jets and used the breathing room to strengthen a wider strike network built around missiles, electronic attack, and upgraded legacy aircraft.
That shift is often misread as a retreat from the F-35. It is not. The Royal Australian Air Force has already completed delivery of its initial fleet, with the final three F-35As arriving in December 2024, and the type now anchors Australia’s fifth-generation combat force. The aircraft’s value lies not only in stealth, but in sensor fusion, networking, and the ability to pass targeting data across a larger force package. In practical terms, the F-35 gives Australia a high-end quarterback in the air, not just another fighter to count on a ramp. The real change is what surrounds that core fleet.
Australia has chosen to keep its F/A-18F Super Hornets in service longer and preserve its EA-18G Growler force, creating a more layered combat system. That decision released funds for deeper stocks of long-range weapons, including up to A$2.12 billion in additional AMRAAM purchases. It also supports a doctrine that emphasizes denial: making it harder for an adversary to operate freely by threatening ships, aircraft, and forward positions at distance. In that framework, extra missiles can matter as much as extra airframes, because a modern air arm can run short of weapons long before it runs short of pilots or jets. Magazine depth becomes part of deterrence, especially in a region defined by long ranges, sparse basing, and the need to sustain operations over time. Australia’s choice reflects that arithmetic.
The Super Hornet’s continued relevance is tied directly to new weapons. In March 2025, the RAAF completed an operational LRASM firing from a Super Hornet, validating a much longer-range maritime strike option. LRASM is designed for contested environments, using onboard sensors that reduce dependence on external guidance and help it find and engage ships even under electronic attack. That gives Australia a way to push anti-ship firepower outward without waiting for an all-new aircraft fleet.
The Growler adds another dimension. Australia remains one of very few U.S. allies to field the EA-18G, a specialized aircraft built for radar suppression, escort jamming, and electromagnetic attack. In a force structure centered on survivability, the ability to blind or confuse hostile sensors is not a supporting detail; it is a force multiplier for every strike package that follows.
The missile path also keeps options open for the 2030s. Australia has already mapped out a broader long-range strike ecosystem that includes weapons such as JASSM-ER, LRASM, and the Joint Strike Missile for internal F-35 carriage. Each fills a different niche: stealthier internal carriage for the F-35, heavier stand-off reach for Super Hornets, and expanded maritime pressure across the wider force. That matters because adding a fourth F-35 squadron would have increased aircraft numbers, but not necessarily solved the harder problem of sustaining combat power across long distances with enough missiles, enough electronic warfare support, and enough targeting resilience.
Australia has not stepped back from the F-35. It has built around it. The result is a more distributed combat model: 72 stealth fighters at the center, upgraded Super Hornets carrying long-range weapons, Growlers shaping the electromagnetic fight, and a larger missile inventory designed to make every sortie count more. For a country planning around range, access, and endurance, that is a strategic tradeoff rather than a procurement pause.
