“Stealth does not make you invisible,” an oft-whispered fighter pilot maxim, was reinforced in movie-like fashion last summer during NATO’s Trident Atlantic 25 exercise in Finland. In a brief but educational instant caught on tape, a French Dassault Rafale targeted its Infrared Search and Track (IRST) capability onto a U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II close up in a high-reward dogfight logging what in training parlance is a “kill.”
The exercise was conducted between June 16 and 27, when more than 40 Finnish, French, British, and American planes converged at a number of Finnish bases to test Agile Combat Employment concepts and practice fourth- and fifth-generation fighter integration. Lock-up happened during Basic Fighter Maneuvers, when the two aircraft were flying in visual range. At the 0:15 mark of the official French Air and Space Force video, the Rafale’s OSF (Optronique Secteur Frontal) system easily displays the F-35 in its target frame a reminder that even highly advanced stealth fighters can be detected under the right circumstances.
The OSF IRST, developed by Safran Electronics & Defense, is a passive sensor suite capable of detecting heat signatures at a distance greater than 100 kilometers. Operating in two frequency bands, it combines an infrared sensor, a TV camera for visual recognition, and a laser rangefinder for precise distance measurement. Because it emits no signals, it cannot be picked up by radar warning receivers, giving pilots a significant advantage in close-in combat. In testing on Indonesian F-16s, the OSF picked up targets over 100 km away and produced high-resolution images including weapons loadouts by 70 km. Against stealth fighters, which are radar-evading but not infrared-evading, these systems would be the difference-maker.
It is not the first time a Rafale has embarrassed an American fifth-generation fighter during training. In 2009, during the United Arab Emirates’ joint exercises, a French pilot took his aircraft to 9Gs in order to set up for a dogfight with an F-22 Raptor, achieving an infrared-guided MICA missile lock that would have killed him. The French Ministry of Defense published video evidence, as it did then and does now, challenging the impression that 4.5-generation fighters are defeated in all regimes by stealth design.
The F-35’s stealth continues to be effective, particularly at beyond-visual-range distances where radar detection is predominant. Its low radar cross-section, sensor fusion, and networked battlespace integration give it an edge in first-look, first-shot combat. But at visual range, where IRST and high-off-boresight missiles come into play, the advantage can be turned around. The Rafale’s aerodynamic agility, twin-engine thrust, and rate of climb along with advanced electronic warfare suites like SPECTRA make it a dangerous opponent after the merge.
The timing of the video’s release, two months after the exercise, cannot be an accident. France is actively promoting the Rafale as an alternative to the F-35 for nations that want to be relieved of U.S. export controls, data-sharing commitments, and logistical dependency. President Emmanuel Macron has tilted towards calls for European defense autonomy, and Dassault Aviation is at the forefront of the Rafale F4.3 norm with AI-led targeting pods, enhanced MICA NG missiles, and better sensor fusion. In 2030, the new-generation Rafale F5 or “Super Rafale” will bring in M88 T-REX engines with 20 percent increased thrust, reduced radar cross-section, and nEUROn unmanned “loyal wingman” drone integration, topped by the ASN4G hypersonic nuclear missile.
The Atlantic Trident 25 exercise in itself was meant to challenge interoperability between fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, airfield repair at speed, and cross-servicing of friendly aircraft in exercise. For the first time, hosting was a breakthrough for NATO integration in Finland, while for France, the mock kill of the Rafale was an effective marketing sensation, emphasizing its message that its fighter remains competitive in an era of stealth predominance.
Technically, the segment demonstrates a basic truth about modern air-to-air combat: survivability is all about layering. Stealth reduces detection range but by no means eliminates passive sensors; IRST systems like the OSF exploit this weak point. As more militaries field such sensors and as thermal management becomes a consideration in design the war between radar evasion and infrared detection will intensify. In that contest, the Rafale’s lock on the F-35 within the Finnish air space was more than a fleeting exercise victory; it was an early indication of the coming balance between pilot skill, sensor technology, and signature management within the battlespace.
